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The amount of compensation received by people plays an influential role in determining their 
commitment to work which in the long run affects performances of companies. There are different types 
of compensation systems and equity-based compensation is one of such which is supposed to help align 
the interest of agent and the principal. This study was conducted to analyse how broad-based equity 
compensation affects performances of selected listed firms in the U.S.  On one hand, two proxies were 
used for firm performance measures: namely Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q representing 
accounting and market-based performance measures respectively. On the other hand, fair value of stock 
options granted was used as proxy for broad-based equity compensation. 
A total of 2064 firm year observations were used in conducting the analysis covering the period from 
2011 to 2015. The results of the study supported one of the hypotheses while the other was not supported 
as far as the impact of stock options granted on firm performances is concerned.  Fair value of stock 
options granted was found to have a positive impact on firms’ accounting performances measured by 
ROA but was found to have a negative impact on market-based performance measured by Tobin’s Q. The 
results of this study concur with several other studies and also confirmed that,other firm characteristics 
such as firm size, leverage, liquidity, growth opportunities and firm age can equally affect performances 
of firms. 
The results of this study have relevant implications for management, shareholders, employees and all 
interested parties in corporate governance. The results will help all these stakeholders in making informed 
decisions when approving the adoption of broad-based equity compensation plans for listed companies. 
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 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background  
Organisations are regarded as legal entities which are separate and distinct from the 
owners. Every organisation exists to serve one purpose or the other. As artificial 
human beings, organisations are run by the third factor of production which is labour. 
The success or failure of which depends on a number of factors and one of such is 
the behaviour of people who work in the organisation because every organisation is 
as good as the people who work within (Mullins,2010). 
Organisational behaviour is regarded as the study of different patterns of both group 
and individual behaviour and the structure of the organisation within which they 
work with the objective of improving the performance of the organisations (Mullins, 
2010, p.3).  Being able to influence behaviour of people is very key in ensuring that, 
their actions lead to the achievement of organisational objectives. 
There are different ways of influencing the behaviour of employees to enable them 
work towards the desired organisational objectives.One of the means of influencing 
the behaviour of employees in any organisation regardless of the size, industry or 
geographic location is by means of compensation. Mullins (2010, p.181) defines 
compensation as the reward given to labour (employee) for the time and efforts made 
towards achieving a given output. A number of theories exist as to what really 
constitutes a compensation system that addresses a number of factors peculiar to 
organisations such as business strategy, national culture and competitive 
environment (Gerhart, Minkoff & Olsen 1995). Individual employee behaviour 
within an organisation is influenced by three theories of compensation which are 
reinforcement and expectancy theory, equity theory and agency theory (Gerhart, 
Minkoff & Olsen, 1995). 
Reinforcement theory simply means that, a behaviour that is recognized and 
rewarded will be repeated by the employee, in the same way, a behaviour that is not 
recognized and rewarded will hardly be repeated. This implies that, the reward will 
trigger a reaction from the employee. Very close to the reinforcement theory is the 
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expectancy theory, which focuses on anticipated rather than the reward that has 
already been benefitted by the employee.  Equity theory also focuses on what 
employees deem to be fair as their reward for their contribution to the organisation in 
comparison with their peers within and outside the organisation (Adams,1963). Thus, 
when employees feel they are not treated fairly, they will resort to various actions to 
resolve the perceived inequity within the organisation. A rather recent theory is the 
agency theory which sees the organisation as an entity made up of different 
stakeholders with different expectations as well as how employee compensations 
could be used to align the interests and expectations of the many different 
stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
The third theory came about due to the separation of ownership of organisations from 
control. This separation of ownership and control is what leads to agency costs. 
Agency costs are the costs that arise out of agency relationships (Gerhart et al, 1995). 
Lambert and Larcker (1989) cited typical examples of agency costs as business 
acquisitions that do not result in value creation, popularly known as empire building, 
expensive spending on perquisites such as club membership, luxury cars and 
chauffeurs. It is equally worthy to note that, agency cost increases in proportion to 
the level of difference existing between management and shareholder attitudes 
towards risks.  For instance, while shareholders are interested in long term firm 
performance that enhances stock values, managers may be interested in short term 
results that gives them higher salaries, especially when they (managers) do not want 
to stay with the company for long. Agency theory cannot be viewed from the 
standpoint of managers and shareholders only, but also covers relationship between 
management and lower level employees (Gerhart et al., 1995). In this vein, managers 
could assume the role of principal in an employment relationship with lower level 
employees. By so doing, the managers can also focus on an employment contract and 
for that matter, compensation schemes that matches managerial interests with that of 
the non-managers. In such contractual relationships, the compensation schemes could 
be designed as behavior-based or outcome-based (Gerhart et al., 1995). Examples of 
behavior-based compensation is merit pay while others such as stock options, 
commission- based pay among others qualify for outcome -based schemes. 
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There has also been a recent development particularly in the field of human resource 
management towards what is known as group-based compensation and individual 
compensation programmes. Dyer and Blancero (1992) predicted the dwindling of 
individual performance-based compensation and increase in group-based 
performance compensation. Individual performance-based compensation includes 
schemes such as bonuses while programmes such as stock plans, profit sharing 
among others fall under group-based compensation programmes. Individual variable 
pay programmes encourage selfish interest maximisation while group compensation 
policies encourage organisation-wide performance (Gerhart et al., 1995).  
Organisations do not exist to achieve individual but collective objectives, that is why 
empirical evidence supports the wide application of group-based compensation 
schemes. Because, organisations that adopt group-based compensations record 
higher productivity per person than organisations that adopt individual-based 
compensation programmes (Weitzman & Kruse, 1990). One of the group-based 
compensation programmes that has gained increased popularity is the equity-based 
compensation. 
1.2 Research problem 
Indeed, a significant number of past researchers have provided empirical evidence in 
their studies in examining the relationship that exist between equity-based 
compensation systems and firm performances.  Some research results point to the 
fact that such compensation schemes impact positively on firm performances while 
others show otherwise. Empirical evidence on the impact of equity-based 
compensation on firm performance still remains mixed and limited (Ittner et 
al.2001). For example, while DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990) find a positive 
relationship between stock option compensation and stock prices of adopting 
companies, Aboody (1996) finds a negative relationship between employee stock 
option programmes and stock prices of adopting companies. In another dimension, 
Watson Wyatt Worldwide (1998) concluded that, firms either offer too high or too 
little equity compensation, especially stock options to employees leading to lower 
returns to shareholders as compared to firms that offer stock options at the 
equilibrium. 
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This current study will help contribute towards the existing knowledge on whether 
broad-based adoption of equity-based compensation plans affect company 
performance positively in the U.S. To be able to address this issue, the main research 
question to be answered is: 
“Does the adoption of broad-based equity compensation in U.S listed companies 
lead to increased firm performances?” 
The following are the specific questions which will be addressed in order to answer 
the general research question above: 
1.Does the adoption of broad-based equity compensation lead to improved ROA of 
the adopting companies? 
2. Does the adoption of broad-based equity compensation lead to improved Tobin’s 
Q of the adopting companies? 
3. Do other factors other than broad-based equity compensation also affect firm 
performances measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q? 
1.3 Purpose of the study 
The aim of this study is to undertake critical examination of the relationship that 
exists between equity-based compensation plans and firm performance of U.S listed 
companies. Earlier studies have shown that there is a direct relationship between 
equity-based compensation programmes and firm performances. However, there 
have been other studies which failed to support this evidence. This study will 
contribute towards this debate. It will also help investors to know how equity-based 
compensation schemes of companies listed on the U.S stock market affect the 
performances of companies in which they are investing, and to know whether their 
interests are aligned with that of managements and lower level employees of such 
companies. This will also be helpful in ensuring efficient contracting as a means of 
addressing the agency problem. 
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The research has the following specific objectives to achieve: 
 To determine the impact of equity-based compensation plan on ROA. 
 To determine the impact of equity-based compensation on Tobin’s Q. 
 To identify other equally important firm characteristics that affect firm 
performance in addition to broad-based equity compensation. 
1.4 Research method 
Research could be inductive or deductive, depending on the method of reasoning 
(Trochim,2006). Whereas deductive reasoning begins from a general perspective to 
specific, inductive reasoning begins from specific to general. Additionally, Creswell 
and Clark (2007, p.23) believe that while the deductive approach of reasoning begins 
from top to down, the inductive approach begins from down to top which is also 
called the bottom up approach. While deductive approach uses quantitative analysis, 
inductive approach uses qualitative analysis. 
Muijs (2004) equally agrees that, any academic research can be categorized as either 
qualitative or quantitative. Aliaga and Gunderson (2002), ( as cited in Muijs, 
2004,p.1), define quantitative approach as the explanation of a phenomena which 
begins with data possessing numerical features and the analysis involves the use of 
mathematically oriented approach such as statistics. 
Quantitative approach also uses testable hypothesis and statistical analysis to 
establish a link between what is already known and what can be learned anew. It also 
uses descriptive statistics for making inferences about the population of interest and 
also makes use of specific parameters in making those inferences from a sample of 
the population (Trochim,2006). It is not uncommon to find visual explanations of the 
collected data in the form of charts, tables, plots and graphs. Out of these, the 
quantitative approach will draw conclusions that are based on logical reasoning, 
empirical evidence and arguments from related literature (Trochim,2006; Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill,2009,p 414-478). 
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On the other hand, qualitative involves collecting data in the form of opinions and 
answers to questions from participants, grouping the data into themes and making an 
own enquiry which may include researcher’s own subjective and bias judgment 
(Creswell,2013, p.22). Researcher participation in the data gathering is very common 
in qualitative research especially in the field of social sciences. It is based on these 
observations and data obtained and analysed that conclusions are drawn. That is why 
the qualitative approach is regarded as inductive reasoning from specific to general 
and the conclusions keep changing as more data is added (Cresswell,2013). 
This thesis will be based on deductive reasoning and quantitative approach will be 
applied. It begins with reviewing appropriate literature and theories related to the 
subject, based on which the hypothesis will be developed. The next is to gather the 
relevant data, analyse it with the view to testing the hypothesis developed. The final 
step is to either accept or reject the hypothesis before drawing the conclusion. 
1.5 Outline of the study 
The whole research has been divided into seven main chapters, with each chapter 
serving as a sub-structure contributing towards attainment of the same aim of the 
research. The first chapter covers the introductory part that throws light on the 
background from which the research problem was coined, the rationale behind the 
use of equity-based compensation, the purpose of the current study, and the 
methodology to be adopted in conducting the study as well as the significance of this 
research. 
The second chapter looks at the theoretical framework around which the whole 
research is built, and which also provided the basis for the formulation of the 
research question. In line with that, various theoretical issues related to equity 
compensation are addressed. It begins with the reasons for the adoption of equity-
based compensation before a review of previous studies by various researchers and 
then the concept of agency theory as well as review of opposing views on why 
agency problem cannot be addressed by equity-based compensation. Aside from that, 
various theories surrounding broad-based equity compensation have also been 
expounded. 
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The third chapter addresses issues regarding institutional background to equity-based 
compensation and the nature and types of equity compensation are equally dealt 
with. Additionally, emergency of equity compensation in the U.S., meaning of 
equity-based compensation, types of equity compensation are also discussed.  
How the hypotheses were developed and the various theoretical issues surrounding 
those hypotheses have been considered in the fourth chapter. From those theories, 
hypothetical propositions were made which would either be accepted or rejected 
based on the outcome of the empirical evidence. Chapter five explains 
methodological issues or the research design regarding how data for the study were 
obtained, and how the various regression models were developed using the variables 
affecting firm performances measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
The descriptive statistics and the analysis have all been duly covered in the sixth 
chapter where analysis of the results is equally carried out. The very final chapter 
wherein the conclusions are drawn based on empirical findings while making 
comparisons with the findings of other studies and the researcher’s own hypotheses 
and expectations or predictions are either confirmed or otherwise. It equally covers 
the summary of limitations of this study. 
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 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE TO UNDERSTANDING 2
CONSEQUENCIES OF EQUITY-BASED COMPENSATION 
This chapter will focus on the key concepts and underlying theoretical framework for 
the thesis. Theories and concepts around which this thesis has been written will be 
explained, beginning with reasons for adoption of equity-based compensation before 
proceeding to prior studies detailing key findings made on the same topic before 
proceeding to agency theory which forms the key issue being addressed by equity-
based compensation. This section will equally explain other theoretical issues 
surrounding broad-based equity compensation.  
2.1 Reasons for adoption of equity-based compensation  
According to Damodaran (2005), equity compensation has three forms. The first is 
regarded as the oldest one where it is awarded only to managers or executives. The 
second is that which is awarded or granted to employees and the third is an option 
given to other parties to the organisation as their compensation. When it comes to 
equity compensation granted to employees, it comes with a number of restrictions 
such as inability of the employee to claim or sell the equity until a certain time period 
has elapsed. The last is where employees are given option to purchase stocks of the 
company at a predetermined price at a certain point in time but also has restrictions 
attached. 
Equity compensation could be targeted at one class of workers or on a broader scale. 
Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse and Blasi (2007) define equity-based compensation as 
broad-based when majority of the company’s employees who work on full time basis 
are awarded such compensation schemes but not just the mere fact that they qualify. 
This may include both executives and non-executives of the company. 
Damodaran (2005) outlines the following as the major reasons behind the adoption 
of equity-based compensation in the U.S as well as other countries: 
First is for the alignment of shareholder-management interests. This is necessary due 
to agency theory which supposes that, managers as agents are less likely to act in the 
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best interest of shareholders because their interest and that of shareholders are 
diverged. For instance, managers may not be interested in borrowing and taking 
risks, and are not comfortable distributing cash to shareholders but will rather engage 
in acquisitions and building empires among others. On the other hand, shareholders 
will be interested in having the value of their investment increased, dividends paid, 
and their general interests served. Because these two parties have different interests, 
that is why the agency problem arises. And it is only when they all have the same 
interests that, the problem can be solved, hence the adoption of equity-based 
compensation. 
Second is the issue of cash constraint. In the U.S, new technology firms in the 1990s 
resorted to equity-based compensation when they entered the stock market but had 
little cash to support their operations. In their bid to attract employees, they offered a 
lot of equity-based compensation programmes and the trend has continued since 
then. 
Next is employee retention. Having attracted employees through equity 
compensation is not an end in itself. Because it is one thing attracting, and another 
thing retaining. And one of the strategies applied to achieve this is by means of 
equity compensation’s requirement of vesting period. This is the time an employee is 
required to remain with the company in order to claim the equity compensation 
benefits. And whether the compensation is a restricted stock or stock option, 
employees are likely to stay with the company most especially when it forms greater 
part of their overall compensation. 
The last reason is accounting and taxation purposes. Companies that use equity 
compensation have more benefits in terms of taxation than those that use cash-based 
compensation systems only. The value of the equity awarded is regarded as tax 
expense though no actual cash leaves the company and this helps the companies in 
paying less taxes. This was hugely boosted by a requirement in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002) which required compulsory treatment of stock options in particular as 
expense (Jackson,2010). The accounting benefits derived by companies is regarded 
as one of the factors that accounted for the 2007-2008 meltdown. That is why 
managers of financial institutions were required to minimize their off-balance sheet 
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leverage as many were using stock options compensation schemes to engage in 
excessive off- balance sheet leverage. Because, this leverage increased their profits 
and share prices but exposed them to higher risks (Scott,2015, p.15). Because those 
accounting benefits were obtained by companies, when the mandatory treatment of 
options as expenses was removed from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), average CEO 
compensation in the U.S declined in the year 2003 (Jackson,2010). 
Similar views have been shared by Hillegeist and Penalva (2003) who believe that 
equity-based compensation programmes are applied for the retention of employees, 
reduction of agency costs and incentivizing workers.  
2.2 Previous studies on impact of equity-based compensation on firm 
performance 
Several researchers have examined the impact of equity-based compensation on firm 
performances in different countries. Sesil,Kroumova,Kruse and Blasi (2007) 
investigated the 490 companies that adopted broad-based stock option compensations 
and how that affected the performances of such companies in comparison with 
companies of similar sizes which did not have equity compensation schemes as part 
of their remuneration programmes. Companies included in this study were from 
different industries such as communication, transportation, manufacturing, retail, 
finance, real estate and other services. Their result revealed that, companies with 
option programmes recorded increase in productivity and Tobin’s Q whiles growth in 
sales and employment were also positive for adopting firms as compared to non-
adopting firms. The level of compensation to workers was also higher for adopting 
companies as compared to non-adopting ones. It also came to light that, average 
productivity remained high to offset the dilution effect of such option programmes, 
thereby not affecting existing shareholder returns. Their findings also supported the 
view that, equity compensation is able to help retain employees in the company 
while giving returns to shareholders. However, one critical thing the study failed to 
establish is the fact that, it is unclear whether the dilution effect as described as 
remaining unaffected due to such option plans was greater than the gains made from 
increased firm performance due to the dilution. This is important because, from 
accounting point of view, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) did establish that, firms that 
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adopt stock option incur an average of 1.5 dollars in order to increase pre-tax net 
profit by 1 dollar. That notwithstanding, this study has shown that the agency 
problem is largely solved by the adoption of stock option programmes by companies. 
Ittner, Lambert and Larker (2001) also investigated the economic determinants and 
performance consequences of equity grants to employees in “new economy” firms 
and were able to establish that, there is a positive relationship between equity grants 
and organisational and functional level performances. Again, factors that new 
economy firms consider before introduction of equity-based compensation schemes 
are different from what old economy firms consider. Firms included in this study 
were mainly from information and telecommunication technology spread across 
different sectors such as networking, semiconductor manufacturing, software 
services, computers and computer peripherals. This study was able to provide 
empirical evidence of the relationship between equity compensation and firm 
performance but equally could not answer the question of whether dilution effect of 
equity compensation is greater than the benefits of such compensation schemes. 
Besides, new economy firms are at the initial stage of choosing their optimum 
compensation plans (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  As a result of that, their equity 
compensation plans are characterized by option overhang where a lot of options are 
not exercised, and this has the potential to negatively affect the market value of the 
firms. This claim is supported by Welles (1998) who indicated that, because such 
firms are relatively new to such compensation schemes, a lot of employees do not 
understand it properly.  And a system that is not well understood by the beneficiaries 
can hardly be relied upon as yardstick for judging the performance of the firm. That 
notwithstanding, though the data characteristics slightly differs from other studies 
being reviewed, the objective remains the same. And this study further deepens 
understanding on the subject of equity-based compensation by shedding light on key 
issues that influence application of equity-based compensation in two different sets 
of groups, being new and old economy firms. 
Some of the limitations of the above studies seem to have been covered in a study 
conducted by Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse and Blasi (2000) on the differences between 
the performances of companies that had adopted broad-based stock option 
compensation and companies that had no such compensation programmes. Industries 
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covered in this study were in the areas of manufacturing, services, communication, 
construction, mining, retail, wholesale, finance and real estate. The findings pointed 
to the fact that, for all the performance indicators measured by performance proxies 
including ROA and Tobin’s Q, companies that employed broad-based stock options 
performed better than those that did not. They also recorded higher shareholder 
return and annual growth than non-adopting companies.  
 
One finding that distinguishes this particular study from the previous studies is that, 
it was able to indicate that, the performance increase was able to offset the dilution 
effect of the introduction of broad-based option compensation programme. What it 
means is that, the performances recorded by the firms were able to compensate for 
the expenses incurred due to the introduction of such compensation system.  This 
also shows that, much as stock option programmes affect firms’ pre-tax profit as 
indicated by Oyer and Schaefer (2005),it is possible to have average profit or 
returnsthat exceed the average cost of such a programme. Their result was also able 
to show that, employee retention was higher in companies that employed broad-
based option compensation as compared to companies that did not. In the nutshell, 
they found that, the agency problem is dealt with through the adoption of such a 
compensation system. 
 
It was also revealed that, companies that adopted such a plan did not record increases 
in fixed salaries paid to workers. Though recent study by Sesil,Kroumova,Kruse and 
Blasi (2007) indicated that compensation level for employees increased, this was said 
to have been accounted for by the equity-based component of the their compenstions 
and not cash-based payments. This supports the notion that, companies that 
sometimes have liquidity constraints adopt such compensation schemes.  Several 
other researchers have also come to the same conclusion. For example, Rosenberg 
(2003) also found that companies adopt stock-based incentives for employees when 
the firms face leverage constraints and find it appropriate to compensate employees 
through stock options. This finding is also consistent with: Yermack, (1995a); Core 
& Guay, (2001); Ikäheimo , Kjellman, Holmberg, & Jussila, (2004). 
19 
All the above studies were based in the U.S., but it is equally important to compare 
results from other parts of the world. Hojen (2007) found no significant differences 
between performances of companies that had adopted equity-based compensation 
schemes and the performances of those that had not adopted equity-based 
compensation schemes in Denmark. The objective was to find out whether 
companies create value for shareholders by way of share price increases and increase 
in operational performances of the adopting companies. Industries that were included 
in the study were from energy, information and telecommunication, consumer 
discretionary, financial services, utilities, health care, consumer staples and 
manufacturing. The findings of this research also indicate the inconclusive evidence 
on the impacts of equity-based compensation on firm performance. However, just 
like any other research, it also shows little on how companies benefit in terms of 
taxation. Again, because it was also a broad-based application of equity 
compensation, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which executives benefit 
compared to that of lower level employees. Apart from that, though equity 
compensation is assumed to result in attraction and retention of employees, nothing 
is known about this from the study. It was also found that, the agency problem does 
not seem to have been solved by adoption of equity-based compensation schemes in 
Denmark. In all, this study also provided another view of how companies perform 
when they adopt equity-based incentive programmes in comparison with those that 
do not adopt such programmes.  
Mehran (1995) also conducted a study on the structure of executive compensation 
and how that affect performances of companies. Unlike the study of Ittner, Lambert 
and Larker (2001) which focused on information and telecommunication industry, 
this study was based on manufacturing industry. The findings indicated that, the 
more equity compensation awarded to executives, the higher the performances of 
those companies measured in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q. It also came to light that, 
companies that had more of their directors being outsiders employed more equity -
based compensation schemes. Though this study was not broad-based application of 
equity compensation, the bottom line is that, it demonstrated that equity-based 
compensation influences firm performance just like previous studies have revealed. 
Frye (2004) also conducted a similar study by extending the result of Mehran (1995) 
which indicated that, indeed companies that employed equity-based compensation 
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recorded higher Tobin’s Q for the period under study. One significant different Frye 
(2004) found was the fact that, the ROA had a negative relationship with the equity-
based compensation system. The possible explanation for this difference is that, it is 
one thing being granted an equity-based compensation and another thing being 
exercised. And because ROA is an accounting ratio, it may take quite a longer period 
before being recognized due to realization and matching principles in accounting.  
All the above studies helped in understanding the effect of equity-based 
compensation on firm performance. However, some only looked at such 
compensation programme applied on a narrower scale where the emphasis is on 
executives only. That is not to say that, equity-based compensation geared towards 
employees will necessarily result in improved firm performance because empirical 
evidence still remains inconclusive. For instance, in a study conducted to ascertain 
the impact of stock option plans and stock market reactions, Ikäheimo, Kjellman, 
Holmberg and Jussila (2004) found that, announcement of employee stock option 
plans targeted at top executives do not lead to significant stock returns and those 
targeted at employees rather result in negative stock market returns.  Rather, the 
argument here is that, agency problem does not exist between management and 
shareholders only, but also between management and lower level employees as 
indicated by Gerhart, Minkoff and Olsen (1995). They demonstrated that it is not 
appropriate to consider agency theory from the viewpoint of managers and 
shareholders only. They explained that, there are different levels of contractual 
relationships. And when contractual relationships exist, agency theory cannot be 
ignored. While the executives have contractual relationship with shareholders, lower 
level employees also have contractual relationships with management, forming 
another agency relationship. One fact that stands out is that, both the executives and 
the lower level employees are working towards one common objective: which is to 
serve the interest of the main principals being the shareholders. Any compensation 
programme could have effect on firm performance. However,to be able to have a 
better assessment of such a compensation scheme on firm performance, it should be 
made available on a wider scale to include all whose inputs contribute towards the 
overall output of the company.  And that is what this current study seeks to achieve. 
Though some of the studies mentioned above focused on broad-based application of 
equity compensation, the latest study is more than a decade ago, and this provides 
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additional motivation to investigate whether there has been a change since. It is 
equally worthy to mention that, the scope of this current study does not cover some 
of the limitations mentioned in the studies above, neither is it aimed at making inter 
firm comparisons as shown in most of the studies, but to make an intra firm 
performance comparison over a given period of time. Finally, this study will 
highlight other firm characteristics aside from equity compensation which equally 
affect performances of U.S listed companies. 
2.3 Agency theory  
In the first place, the issue of equity-based compensation is a subject of corporate 
governance. There are a number of theories of corporate governance such as agency 
theory, stewardship theory and resource dependency theory. For the purpose of this 
thesis, agency theory will be reviewed. 
The need for having agents arose out of separation of ownership and control of firms 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this regard, suppliers of capital (shareholders) for the 
corporations are considered separate entities from those responsible for the day-to-
day running of the companies (managers). The suppliers of capital are regarded as 
principals and those running the companies are the agents. The agents’ responsibility 
is to perform certain tasks and to make decisions for and on behalf of the principals 
(Ross, 1973). Because the agents are rational, they could pursue their interests in 
ways that will not be in line with the interests of principals. It is out of this tendency 
that the agency theory was born.  
Agency theory is simply defined as the relationship between one party (agent) and 
another (principal) where the latter delegates decision making authority to the former 
to perform certain services on behalf of the latter (Jensen & Meckling 1976). It is 
worthy to note that, engaging the services of agents is not a cost-free activity. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) classify the cost of agency relationships as bonding costs, 
monitoring costs and residual losses. Bonding costs are instituted to restrict the agent 
from taking certain actions that will harm the interests of shareholders and where 
such decisions are taken, could result in financial compensation to the shareholder. 
Monitoring cost is in reference to costs that are paid by the principal to ensure that 
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the agent conducts himself within acceptable limit of behavior. Finally, residual 
losses arise when the first two agency costs fail to result in more benefits than their 
costs, in which case the costs exceed the benefits derived from their institution. 
The agency theory is also viewed as a branch of the game theory which involves the 
study of contractual relationship between principal and the agent where the contract 
is designed in a way that is self-motivating for the agent to serve the interest of the 
principal (Scot, 2015,p.358). And this relationship often leads to moral hazard 
because while the principal will be looking for performance from the agent, the agent 
will also be looking for more reward. To deal with this challenge, Scot (2015) opines 
that two major contracts exist in handling the moral hazard issue. First is the 
employment contract between the firm and the manager while the second is the 
lending contract between the manager and the lenders to the firm. For the purpose of 
this study, emphasis is laid on the employment contract between shareholders as 
principals and the managers and employees as agents.  One of the key elements of 
every employment contract is the compensation of the agent since that is what will 
motivate the agent to serve the interest of the principal well. 
2.3.1 Reduction of agency problem via equity-based compensation 
The agency theory generally implies that there is the existence of conflict which 
originates from agent’s interests which are often not in line with that of the principal 
(Scot 2015:357).Because managers and employees in general are rational human 
beings, whether their compensation is tied to the performance of the companies or 
not, they may bias their decisions to serve their personal interests and this is what is 
called the opportunistic behavior (Scot 2015, p.326). As a result, there is the need for 
policies to control such tendencies. And this is done through efficient contracting and 
enhancing stewardship role. It is the stewardship that helps to protect debtholder and 
shareholders from opportunistic behaviours especially from workers in the 
organisation whether they hold managerial positions or not. Efficient contracting is 
very necessary because of information asymmetry. That is, workers especially 
managers within the organisation have certain information that outsider contract 
parties do not have. Because managers have their individual interests which may not 
be in line with that of shareholders, there is the need to enter into contract with them 
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in such a way as to align their interests with that of shareholders. By so doing, even if 
shareholders (principals) do not have access to all the information, by virtue of such 
contracts, their agents (managers) will still be compelled to work in the best interest 
of shareholders. Several research findings abound of possible opportunistic 
behaviours avoided by means of efficient contracting to solve the agency problem.   
Dechow (1994) investigated whether managers as agents use accruals efficiently or 
opportunistically. She argued that, if accruals are found to be the result of 
opportunistic behaviours of managers, the market will reject accruals income in 
favour of cash flows. On the other hand, if accruals income is seen to be a reflection 
of efficient contracting, then accruals income will be more favourable and will have 
a direct relationship with share returns which is a proxy for shareholder value. Her 
findings revealed that net income had more association with share returns than cash 
flow which was evidence that there were not opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
management in using accruals opportunistically and thus there was efficient 
contracting.  
 Bharath,Sunder,and Sunder (2008) investigated the effect of accounting quality on 
interest rates charged in public and private lending markets. They argued that, firms 
with higher accruals means management have the higher tendency to engage in 
opportunistic behaviours. They found that firms that have lower interest rates are less 
likely to be engaged in opportunistic behaviours because they also have lower 
accruals. This is consistent with efficient contracting because the lending market will 
favour firms that have higher accounting quality by giving such firms loans with 
lower interest rates. 
Mian and Smith (1990) also conducted a study on efficient contracting. They also 
used consolidation of parent and subsidiary companies as yardstick for their study. 
They argued that, the greater the level of interdependence between the parent and the 
subsidiary, the lesser the tendency to engage in opportunistic behaviours by 
management and the more efficient the contract will be. It means, the greater the 
level of interdependence, the greater the tendency to evaluate the performance of the 
group jointly and the more efficient such contract will be. Because, it is always better 
to evaluate the consolidated financial statement of the group than their separate 
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financial statements. As such, the greater the level of interdependence between 
parent and subsidiary, the higher the tendency to consolidate their financial statement 
and the lesser the possibility of opportunistic behavior. 
These findings are indications that, the principal can be at the mercy of the agent if 
not for the existence of efficient contracting as a means to address the conflict of 
interest between shareholders and management. And this is the whole impulse of 
agency theory where there is the existence of conflict between the agent and the 
principal because their interests are at variance with each other.  
Since these conflicts are as a result of perceived inadequate compensation, owners or 
shareholders have to incur incentive contract costs in order to solve this problem 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The aforementioned research findings on efficient 
contracting assumed the existence of agency relationship between management and 
shareholders. However, incentive contract theory does not apply to management 
only, but to lower level employees as well. The essence of applying broad-based 
equity compensation calls for widening the net to cover lower level employees since 
the performance of companies are not influenced by management alone, but to a 
large extent by non-executive employees as well (Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse and 
Blasi,2007).  
Eisenhardt (1988) is of the view that, to be able to determine appropriate 
compensation programme which will be appropriate for any organisation, it has to be 
cited within the framework of agency theory. And in designing appropriate 
compensation programme for an organisation, there is the need to ensure it is enough 
to motivate workers and does not cost too much either, and this leads to efficient 
contracting. To ensure contract efficiency, there is the need to consider cost of moral 
hazard, monitoring cost, risk bearing attitude of agent, and pay-performance 
relationships (Eisenhardt, 1988). 
As pointed out by Gerhart et al (1995) it will be inappropriate to view agency theory 
from the standpoint of managers and shareholders alone.  This is because, the 
manager who is an agent has an employment contract with shareholders who serve as 
the principal. By the same token, managers could assume the role of principal in an 
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employment relationship with lower level employees. So in the long run, both the 
lower level employee and the managers are both serving the common interest of the 
ultimate principals who are the shareholders.  It is based on this that Eisenhardt 
(1988) posits that, the best compensation programme that helps in dealing with the 
agency problem is not the compensation that just aligns the interests of managers 
with shareholders only. Rather, such as compensation schemes should also be 
extended to cover lower level employees because they even constitute the largest 
portion of the total workforce of every company. It is based on this that, equity 
incentives should not be targeted only at executives but should be broad-based to 
benefit all workers, whether executives or non-executives. This is based on the 
reasoning that, if only executives are entitled to such long-term compensation plans 
excluding lower level employees, executives may feel motivated enough, but lower 
level employees may not. And since they are at the operational level of the 
organization, their output is what will largely determine the performance of the 
executives’ performance. 
Again, because broad-based equity compensation scheme falls under group incentive 
scheme, it enhances team work and reduces suboptimality as far as performances are 
concerned. This results in improvement in team result due to the ease with which 
information is shared among management and lower level employees. According to 
Morishima (1988), when there is free sharing of information between management 
and lower level employees, it leads to improvement in productivity and the profit 
levels of companies due to reduction of information asymmetry. Additionally, 
Hochberg and Lindsey (2010) also assert that, workers are motivated to jointly work 
towards the maximisation of the common goal of the organisation and they are also 
involved in mutual monitoring to ensure that every beneficiary is working towards 
the common good. 
Another reason why equity-based compensation helps resolve agency problem can 
be looked at from the efficiency wage theory. In this case, individuals are likely to 
stay with an organisation that provides compensation that goes beyond the market 
rate. 
26 
The above reasons for the adoption of equity-based compensation as antidote to the 
agency problem has been summed up Holmström and Milgrom (1991), who believe 
that equity-based compensation programmes are used to serve a dual purpose. The 
first is to serve as working tool to mitigate and share risks between the principal and 
the agent and also providing an incentive package to encourage productive behavior. 
It helps promote risk sharing responsibility between agent and principal because 
there is co-ownership of the business, and so the principal is not the only one who 
will suffer the consequences if the company is not ran efficiently. This is an 
indication that, once an agent is a part owner of the business, he is also acting as a 
principal at the same time. The second argument is that, the agent will be motivated 
enough to avoid negative or opportunistic behaviour at work. And when the agent is 
motivated enough to work, other things being equal, the firm performance will 
increase which becomes a win-win situation for both the agent and the principal.  
From theoretical perspective, equity-based compensation seem to help deal with the 
agency problem. Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that equity-based 
compensation increases risk taking behaviour and provides enough motivation to 
encourage hard working attitude within the organisation since compensation is linked 
with the performance of the company. 
2.3.2 Critiques of equity compensation as a solution to agency problem 
Though theory and empirical evidence have indicated that, equity-based 
compensation helps in addressing the agency conflict, there are a number of 
criticisms which cannot be overlooked. It is for this reason that, Sesil et al (2005) 
pointed out that, it has to be cited within the right context before making any 
accurate judgment on whether it really helps deal with the agency conflict. 
Much as the equity-based compensation is expected to motivate the agent to work 
towards attainment of long-term goals, Hall (2003) has indicated that, it has the 
tendency to encourage attainment of short-term results at the expense of long-term 
goals. This is consistent with Gerhart, Minkoff and Olsen (1995) who also share the 
same opinion that, in cases where the management intend to have a short-term stint 
with the company, their focus will be on achieving short term goals in order to earn 
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as much as they want and quit the job. And when short-term goals are pursued due to 
the introduction of equity-based compensation, it is regarded as value destroying 
behavior instead of a value creating one. An example of such value destroying 
behavior is when management tries to achieve short term results that will lead to 
increase in price of shares within the short term. The case of Enron can be cited as a 
reference. In order to maintain the value of the stock option of executives, earnings 
management practices were adopted (Dharan & Bufkins, 2008). Because of these 
practices, there were high investor expectations and these could not be met resulting 
in agency costs because the stock was overvalued. And this is what led to short-term 
measures by management to increase stock prices. 
Apart from that, though it is expected that, equity-based compensation will promote 
risk taking among agents, not all equity compensation programmes will promote risk 
taking. An example is when a company grants stock options where the option can be 
in the money or out of money. An option is said to be “in the money” when it has an 
incentive effect (Ittner,Lambert & Larker, 2003). On the other hand, when it is out of 
money, it will serve as a disincentive and risk taking will be affected. 
Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) argue that, there will always be information 
asymmetry and that, the principal will always have some cost to bear. The reason is 
that, there is internal information that the external shareholder does not have access 
to. And in designing the compensation, the management can withhold certain vital 
information from the compensation committee, especially when it bothers on 
performances to which the compensation is linked.    
Finally, Kima and Ouimet (2014) and Sesil et al (2005) further indicate that, broad-
based equity compensation could lead to free rider problem. Apart from the free rider 
problem, in a work environment where there is the application of fixed wage for 
employees in addition to equity-based compensation, if there are any gains from the 
equity-based compensation scheme, the employees will only regard the gain made as 
mere cushioning against rising cost of living and will not be motivating enough to 
improve firm performance. 
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2.4 Other theories of broad-based equity compensation 
Broad-based compensation like any other concept has several other theories 
surrounding it. Though, agency problem happens to be the core issue this 
compensation is trying to address in this study,it is not out of place to delve into 
other equally important theories that are associated with this form of compensation. 
2.4.1 Output-based incentive theory 
This theory is based on the assumption that, when the efforts of employees can easily 
be checked, then the solution to agency problem lies in employing a fixed pay policy. 
However, in reality, due to complexities in the nature of most jobs, it is hard to have 
every aspect of employee’s job well monitored and assessed in order to assign fixed 
compensations. According to Gerhart (2000), Milkovich and Newman (2002), these 
complexities are compounded by peculiar characteristics of firms in addition to the 
macro-economic environment in which those firms operate. It is as a result of the 
challenges in accurately assessing the jobs done by the employees that output-based 
incentive is considered to be the ideal compensation policy (Eisenhardt, 1988). And 
one of the such compensation policies is equity-based compensation programmes 
where the firm’s overall output determines how much employees receive. 
2.4.2 Collective effort and free rider theory 
According to Weitzman (1995), when group-based compensation hinges on group 
performances,it is difficult to assess the performances of individuals. This creates 
room for individuals to play minimal or inactive roles in achieving the overall firm 
objectives. It is in view of this that, Kandel and Lazear (1992) have recommended 
the institution of measures that promote cooperation among employees in 
organisations where group-based compensation programmes are in place.  
2.4.3 Psychological expectancy theory 
According to Vroom (1995), group-based compensation system such as broad-based 
equity compensation will serve its meaningful purpose only when the employees to 
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whom it is targeted are able to have some level of control over the performance 
measures such as ROA and Tobin’s Q to which their reward is attached. But in its 
very form, employees have little or no control over these performance indicators. 
This is quite counterproductive to the essence of group-based compensation where 
the aim is among other things, to influence group behaviour in the right direction to 
improve firm peformance. And this is emphasized by Kandel and Lazear (1992) who 
indicated that, group behaviour is well emphasized under group-based compensation 
when the compensation beneficiaries can readily point to performance indicators to 
their peers and also exercise control over the indicator. But ROA and Tobin’s Q are 
far beyond the reach of lower level employees who stand to benefit under broad-
based options granted.  
2.4.4 Accounting myopia 
According to Hall and Murphy (2003), the cost of granting options is wrongly 
calculated and incorporated into the financial statement. Since organisations aim at 
offering compensation at a rather reduced cost to the rank and file, the miscalculated 
cost of broad-based compensation is not insulated from this theory. For instance, 
when organisations grant stock options to employees, the cost of such a transaction 
may be understated. This is largely because, the simple golden rule of accounting 
recognizes that, to every debit entry, there should be a corresponding credit entry. In 
this case, as other employees are offered opportunity to become part owners of the 
company, existing shareholders have their ownership dwindled by means of dilution 
effect. So not until this has been properly addressed in ascertaining the cost of stocks 
granted, the cost of such a compensation programme will always be understated. 
2.4.5 Worker-management alliance  
According to Kim and Ouimet (2014) Pagano and Volpin (2005), there are times in 
the life of organisation when takeover becomes obvious. To avoid such 
developments, management resort to ‘bribing’ or incentivizing employees in order to 
win their support in the event that a block-stakeholder moves for a takeover of the 
firm. And management can in place of increased wages and salaries grant equity-
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based compensation to a large number of employees as a means of buying their 
loyalty which is a reason other than firm performance-driven objective. 
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 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND ON EQUITY-BASED 3
COMPENSATION 
This part will also provide detailed explanation on equity-based compensation 
system, the origin of this compensation in the U.S and current corporate governance 
practices surrounding it.  
Khan (2011) defines corporate governance as the various methods, structures and 
systems that are put in place to manage and direct the affairs of companies towards 
attainment of organisational goals and minimising agency problems. At the core of 
corporate governance is the admittance of the fact that, there is the existence of 
relationships between different stakeholders who may be internal or external to the 
company.  And this relationship exists primarily because ownership is separated 
from control, leading to agency relationship (Jensen & Meckling 1976). The essence 
of corporate governance is to ensure the minimisation of the agency problem. As 
such, companies that have strong corporate governance structures are likely to have 
weaker agency problems and companies with weak corporate governance systems 
have strong agency problems (Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999). Evidence of this 
assertion abound in recent history. Several corporate scandals which occurred in the 
late 1990s to the early 2000s heightened the interest of the general public in 
corporate governance issues which includes compensation schemes. Aligning the 
interest of agents with that of the principal is therefore paramount in contemporary 
corporate governance discourse. Jensen (1986) points out that, managers sometimes 
fail to pay dividends to shareholders even when excess cash becomes available. It is 
therefore not surprising that, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 which came to effect 
following the corporate scandals which included the infamous Worldcom case 
strongly recommended the improvement of corporate governance practices (Scot 
2015,p.9). 
Unlike securities laws which are regulated at the federal level, corporate laws are 
usually administered by states in the U.S. The U.S Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is more concerned with the disclosures made by companies 
rather than the structure of those companies (Hollister, 2005).  The United States is a 
market-oriented country and one of the characteristics of such countries is the 
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existence of strong shareholder protection because legislation is usually based on 
common law (Barth, Cram, & Nelson,2001). Shareholder value maximisation 
became a subject of great interest to managers in the 1990s due to numerous 
takeovers witnessed in the U.S. In their bid to keep their jobs and to avoid unwanted 
takeovers, executives of companies begun to align their interests with that of 
shareholders by adopting compensation schemes under the concept of shareholder 
value creation (Dobbin & Zorn,2005). This concept which became very popular 
within the corporate world in the U.S simply means that, the reason for the existence 
of a company is to promote the economic well-being of shareholders through the 
payment of dividends or by taking actions that will lead to an increase in share price 
(Jackson,2010).Due to this concept, shareholders are really influential in the U.S 
today and their influence permeates through the board structure of companies, 
executives and compensation of directors and strong emphasis on investor relations. 
In spite of strong protection by the law, shareholders as investors do not devote as 
much resources towards corporate governance practices as it should, especially with 
institutional investors. Institutional investors normally do not commit so much into 
formulating policies on corporate governance, nomination of their representatives to 
the corporate board of directors and shareholders proposals (Black, 1998; Choi & 
Fisch, 2008).According to Coffee (2003,p.9), there was a paradigm shift from 
complete cash-based compensation to equity-based compensation in the 1990s which 
shifted the focus of management towards the performances of the stocks of their 
companies. This phenomenon was also heightened by a roundtable discussion by 
executives of the largest companies in the U.S who came to the final conclusion that, 
the directors’ main job is to ensure that the interest of all stakeholders have been 
taken into consideration or to promote the long-term interest of their shareholders 
(Jackson,2010). The concept of shareholder value maximisation has also influenced 
activism by trade unions and employees who also advocate for empowerment 
through pension programmes and long-term incentive plans such as equity-based 
compensation. This is what has generally shaped the corporate governance structure 
of the U.S till date. Based on the success of the U.S system, the Organisation for 
Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) in the year 1997 developed a 
world-wide system which was modelled after the U.S corporate governance practices 
(Jackson,2010).Contemporary U.S corporate governance is characterized by five 
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factors which are shareholder activism, market for corporate control, boards 
independence, executive remuneration and the role of gatekeepers (Jackson,2010). 
3.1 Emergence of equity compensation in U.S.A 
Equity compensation in general emerged and begun to gain popularity in the U.S in 
the 1980s (Mehdi & Imen, 2014). The U.S as an example of Anglo Saxon system is 
highly characterized by dispersed ownership of companies but used to have low 
institutional ownership of firms where one leader was charged with management and 
control of firms and such an individual was supervised by the financial market 
(Morland, 1995; Charreaux, 1997). This view had already been confirmed by Berly 
and Means (1932), that individuals possessed the highest percentage of ownership in 
corporations. This trend continued into the 1980s according to a study of corporate 
governance in the U.S conducted by Jackson (2010). Though dispersion of corporate 
ownership was in existence in the 1930s, it was established that between 1960s to the 
1970s, managers wielded too much power coupled with weak ownership. It is this 
separation of ownership and control as early as the 1930s that led to the agency 
problems (Berle & Means, 1932). The agency problem was hugely contributed by 
nature of the board composition which gave shareholders minimal control and board 
decisions did not inure to the benefits of shareholders as it should have been. 
According to Mace (1971), boards were usually made up of insiders, both current 
and past executives, the CEO’s friends mostly from “old boys’ network”. This board 
composition made it difficult for CEO decisions to be challenged by the board, 
thereby compounding the agency problem. The most affected by this challenge were 
shareholders because they had no control over selection of board members and the 
legal requirement at the time was cumbersome and expensive if they were to have 
proxy voting and having access for them to suggest their own candidates was not 
easy either (Gordon, 2007, p.1496-1497).  Remuneration committees were equally 
not in existence at the time and so executives were paid fixed salaries and if they 
were to receive bonuses, those were tied to the company annual performance 
(Jackson, 2010). This means that, employees were also paid based on the same 
system. This equally implied that, for lower level employees to get promoted, they 
needed to remain loyal to their senior level managers and also had to show enough 
commitment (Kanter, 1978). 
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However, there was a turn of event during the 1980s due to foreign competition 
which was also characterized by high interest rates, stagnation of stock returns and 
company growth among others (Jackson, 2010). This engineered activism from 
different stakeholders where institutional investors became significant shareholders 
in companies. It was during those times that, shareholder value creation gained the 
attention of all stakeholders as a solution to the agency problem. 
The increased popularity of equity-based compensation over the past thirty years in 
the U.S was also based on the same agency theory which suggested that, the best way 
to ensure that agents’ interests were aligned with that of principals was to tie their 
compensation to the company performance. This call was further enhanced by a 
number of institutions such as United Shareholders Association, the Council of 
Institutional Investors and large state pension funds (Senbet, 2011). This led to the 
creation of the link between executive compensation and firm performance. A key 
issue here was the introduction of stock options and other forms of equity-based 
compensation systems (Jensen & Murphy, 2004). To the extent that, the increased 
competition and underperformance of U.S companies during those times led to 
widespread takeovers, the U.S congress placed a limit on the level of cash 
compensation to executives which was supplanted by increase in equity-based 
compensation (Coffee Jr., 2003). By the 1980s, the increasing trend of equity-based 
compensation had been widely accepted by managers in the U.S and the concept of 
shareholder value maximization had also become acceptable as a means of 
addressing the agency problem till date (Dobbin & Zorn,2005). This has also been 
confirmed by Jackson (2010), who indicated that, equity-based compensation and 
stock options in particular became the most popular form of compensation as part of 
the restructuring and orientation towards alignment of principal and shareholder 
interests. 
Several studies have confirmed the increased popularity of equity-based 
compensation due to the perceived benefits to organisations that offer such 
compensation programmes. In the U.S., this form of compensation increased more 
significantly during the 1990s (Ofek & Yermark,2000). Morgenson (1998) indicated 
that in the year 1997, the 200 largest organisations in the U.S had set aside as much 
as 13% of their stocks for management alone, which represented an increase of more 
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than 7% over the previous eight years.   This trend was also confirmed by a survey of 
415 companies conducted by the U.S Federal Reserve which showed that, one third 
of the companies had actually applied broad-based equity compensation (Lebow, 
Sheiner, Slifman, & Starr-McCluer, 1999.p. 11). In addition, The Center for 
Effective Organisation of the University of Southern California came to the same 
conclusion that, there was an increasing trend of broad-based equity compensation 
when it surveyed 279 Fortune 1000 firms in the year 1993 and 212 Fortune 1000 
firms in the year 1996. The percentage of companies offering broad-based equity 
compensation plans to more than 20% of their workers over the period went up from 
30% to 51% (Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford 1998.p. 34). The continuous increasing 
trend is an indication of the importance of this form of compensation in the U.S. 
3.2 The nature and types of equity compensation plans in the U.S 
The U.S Internal Revenue Service (IRS, 2015) defines equity-based compensation as 
any form of compensation that is paid to an employee, director or independent 
contractor of an organization where the monetary unit of the compensation is based 
on the value of the stock of the employer, whether the employer is a corporation or a 
partnership entity.  
There are different types of equity-based compensation schemes available for all 
employees and management.  They are employee stock options, employee stock 
purchase plans, restricted stock plans, employee stock ownership plans and different 
qualified retirement plans (Frye, 2004). These plans are put into two main categories. 
Frye (2004) groups them into nonretirement and retirement plans depending on the 
time during which the employee qualifies for such a plan. Apart from these types, 
there are other equity equivalent compensation schemes that are available in the U.S 
(IRS,2015; Dupee 1990). They are stock warrants, restricted stock units, phantom 
stock plans and stock appreciation rights.  
3.2.1 Stock options  
According to Wallin,Schalla and Apellman (2015), option gives the right to an 
individual (optionee) to buy a certain number of shares of company at a specified 
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price after the expiration of a particular time period known as the vesting period. 
Stock options derive its name from the fact that the optionee has the right to either 
purchase the stocks or to decline the purchase at the specified price. At the grant 
date, the price of the stock must be equivalent to the fair value of the stock, where 
fair value is the price at which the stock is traded on the stock market (Ittner et 
al.2001). There are three main stages that stock option goes through in its lifecycle. 
The first is the time when companies grant the options, which is called the grant date. 
The second phase is the option exercise where the optionee does the actual 
purchasing of the stock at the price. After this stage, the person becomes a 
stockholder. The final stage is the sale where the stockholder sells the stocks to 
another person. 
Stock options usually vest over a period of time and in most cases the date of expiry 
is after ten years (Itner et al.2001; Schubert & Barenbaum,2008). Firms intentionally 
introduce vesting requirements as a means of encouraging employees to stay with the 
company (Damodaran, 2005). What distinguishes stock options granted to employees 
from those granted to executives is that, employees are under no obligation to submit 
anything to the U.S Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to report the option 
exercise details (Frye, 2004). In most cases, employee stock options are nonqualified 
plans. A nonqualified stock options simply means that, the employee who is entitled 
to the stock will be required to pay normal income tax on the difference between 
grant price and the market value of the stock (IRS, 2014). Also, employee stock 
options are not tradable which is an indication that, they are required to exercise the 
options before leaving the firm. And because the option portfolio could be built over 
time, the time period during which the employee remains with the firm leads to 
increased option incentives, making it difficult for other competing companies to hire 
such employees (Core, Guary & Larcker, 2003). 
Stock option compensations are used as a means of tying the compensation of 
workers directly to the stock prices (Jenter & Frydman, 2010). In the U.S., stock 
options became the most popular form of executive compensation during the 1990s. 
This has been attributed partly to the favourable tax regime where stock options were 
taxed at the very lowest rate as far as capital gain taxes are concerned. This view has 
been supported by earlier studies into the surge in the adoption of option 
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compensation during that time (Murphy, 2002; Hall & Murphy, 2003). According to 
Jenter and Frydman (2010), stock option compensation constituted 20% of CEO 
compensation and increased to 49% in the year 2000. However, the trend changed 
after the stock market crash in 2001 where restricted stock options became more 
popular by the year 2006 (Jenter & Frydman,2010). According to Jackson (2010), 
there was further decline in the use of stock option compensation particularly to 
CEOs after the 2007-2008 meltdown due to accounting treatment of option expenses 
which were removed from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). 
3.2.2 Restricted stock 
Restricted stocks are shares of companies that are granted to employees and one of 
the main characteristics is that, it cannot be sold by the employee over a given period 
of time (PWC,2018). Ofek and Yermack (2000) have indicated that, the sale of such 
shares is barred for a minimum period of three to five years in the U.S. Employees 
acquire these shares after meeting certain restrictions which have been imposed by 
the employer. Wallin, Schalla and Spellman (2015) include some of such restrictions 
as those related to transfers and the right of the employer to buy back the shares after 
the contractual relationship ceases to exist. Usually, such stocks are bought back by 
the employer when necessary at the original price of the equity in some cases, the 
lower of the fair value and the original cost of the shares.  This is normally for 
unvested shares. But in the case of vested shares, if the employee resigns, or the 
employer terminates the contractual relationship without cause, then the purchase 
price will be the fair value. On the other hand, if the contractual relationship is 
terminated by the employer for a cause, then the purchase price will be the lower of 
market price and the original cost (Wallin, Schalla & Spellman,2015). 
According to Schubert and Barenbaum (2008), this type of equity-based 
compensation system could be absolute or relative. Under the relative model, 
restricted stock is awarded to individuals within an organisation based on some 
performance measures (Schubert & Barenbaum,2008). For instance, the measuring 
indicator could be firm performance measures such as the firm’s return on equity 
which could also be based on comparative analysis of similar firms’ performances. 
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Usually, firms award this to their employees after comparing their own performances 
with similar firms in the same industry. 
When such an equity-based compensation system is targeted at executives of a 
company, there is always a baseline for awarding such stocks. Because it is based on 
comparative analysis of similar firms, if the management of the firm underperforms 
in comparison with competitors, executives will be awarded fewer number of shares. 
On the other hand, if they outperform competitors, they will be entitled to more 
shares. This is what is called ex ante award model (Schubert & Barenbaum,2008). 
With the absolute model, restricted stocks are awarded without attachment to any 
specific performance. Rather, the board of directors decide other criteria for the 
award such as the position occupied by an executive. But this is not to say that, 
performance measurement is totally out of the criteria for the award (Schubert & 
Barenbaum,2008).  
3.2.3 Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP) 
The employee stock purchase plan allows employees to buy stocks of companies at a 
discount, usually 15% of the market value of the stock (Frye, 2004). The reason why 
the discount is a bit substantial is to make sure the employee will make some profit 
even if the share price does not increase or even when there is a slight decrease in the 
share price (Bryson & Freeman,2014). This is more like a gift to employees to 
encourage them to increase productivity. However, they have a part to play in order 
to obtain this. Usually, the participating employees make financial contributions 
towards the plan through deductions from their salaries and must also hold the shares 
for a certain period of time.  The employee pays part of the stock price while the 
employer pays the remaining amount (Bhagat, Brickley & Lease,1984). The 
company then uses the built-up fund to buy the stocks for the employees on the 
purchase date. It is also worthy to note that, such arrangement does not yield tax 
benefits to the employee. Because, if the employer makes part payment for such 
stocks, the company will make deduction from the employee’s salary while the 
employee includes it as a taxable income. Employee stock purchase plans can take 
the form of a qualified plan or a nonqualified. The qualified plans will normally 
require the consent of shareholders before it can be implemented and there is a cup 
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on the maximum price of discount that can be allowed. However, the nonqualified 
plan is not subjected to as many restrictions as the qualified plans. 
3.3 Other equity-equivalent compensation schemes 
As already mentioned, there are other forms of stock equivalent or equity equivalent 
compensation schemes available in the U.S such as phantom stock plans, stock 
appreciation rights, stock warrants and restricted stock units (IRS, 2015; 
Dupee,1990). These types of stock equivalents help the employees to also receive 
compensations or benefits which are parallel to those earned by shareholders 
(Dupee,1990). 
3.3.1 Phantom stock plans 
Under such an equity-based compensation system, the employee is given a certain 
number of units that can be obtained in the form of shares of the company 
(Deloitte,2018). In this case, the employees have the benefits of stock ownership, but 
they do not in actual sense own stocks of the company. That is why it is sometimes 
referred to as “shadow stock” or “synthetic equity”.  As Miller (2012) puts it, its 
purpose is to create a sense of ownership in the mindset of the beneficiaries who 
have been helping grow the business. This again implies that, there is no dilution 
effect after granting of phantom stock to employees. This type of ownership does not 
give the holder any voting right like an ordinary shareholder. How much an 
employee receives on this unit is always determined by the value of the company’s 
equity on the stock market. 
3.3.2 Stock Appreciation Rights (SAR) 
This form of equity form of compensation is also not a direct equity but rather gives 
the holder some rights to receive payment from the company based on how much the 
current stock price has risen over and above the base value (Bierce,2017). The holder 
of this right is equivalent to an unsecured creditor. Because, if the company goes 
bankrupt, the company is under no legal obligation to pay for how much the holder is 
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entitled to. The payment for stock appreciation right can be made either in cash or 
stocks of the company.  
3.3.3 Stock warrants 
Warrants are rights given to individuals to buy stocks of companies usually at a 
certain date and at a price lower than the normal price at which stocks are sold 
(KPMG,2018).Miller (1970) also defines warrants as a certificate given to an 
individual by a company where the holder gives it back to the company at the end of 
a certain period of time in exchange for residual ownership of the company that 
issued it. 
Warrants could also be given to already existing shareholders who would like to 
purchase more shares in the company. The company that issues the stock warrant is 
bound by the agreement to deliver to the holders of such agreements a certain 
number of shares at a particular time, and at a certain price under the conditions 
specified by the company (Berle,1927). 
Miller (1970) mentions the following as the unique features of warrants: 
1. The price at which it can be exercised does not change or can increase at pre-
specified intervals 
2. Provisions are set at different maturity dates 
3. The holder can tender it in in exchange for stocks of the company or cash 
equivalent 
4. There are varying degrees of dilution protection 
3.3.4 Restricted Stock Units (RSU) 
This represents a promise that is made by a company to deliver a certain number of 
shares to its employees only after certain vesting conditions have been fulfilled 
(PWC,2018).  Though restricted stock units in a sense represents an interest an 
employee has in a company, however, not until vesting conditions have been met, 
they remain intangible. For instance, an employee may be required to stay with the 
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company for a certain number of years before or after certain performance standards 
have been met. Usually, after vesting, fair market value is used in measuring how 
much they are worth. 
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 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 4
This chapter provides explanations on the theoretical basis for the development of 
the hypotheses that are being tested in this study. Also, some of the previous studies 
which were reviewed under chapter two are used to provide backing for the 
hypotheses developed. 
From the above discussions, equity-based compensation is believed to help address 
the agency problem.  And if agency problem is addressed, then other things being 
equal, adoption of equity-based compensation should have a significant positive 
relationship with a company’s performance measured by Return on Assets (ROA).  
This has been supported by a number of previous studies (Sesil,Kroumova,Kruse and 
Blasi 2007; Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse and Blasi, 2000; Mehran 1995; Kuo,Li & Yu 
2013) . Again, the existence of efficient contracting will also support this hypothesis 
in the sense that, there will be little motivation for agents to engage in opportunistic 
behaviour and when this is avoided, firms’ performances measured by accounting 
and market-based indicators will significantly improve. This assertion has equally 
been supported by previous studies (Dechow 1994; Bharath,Sunder,and Sunder 
2008; Mian and Smith 1990). Finally, this will equally suggest that, the stakeholder 
theory proposed by Freeman (1984) would have been served. Based on this, the 
following hypothesis has been developed for testing:  
Hypothesis 1: There is positive relationship between broad-based equity 
compensation and ROA of U.S listed firms. 
Further, as Return on Assets (ROA) is an accounting performance measure, it is 
equally prudent to measure performance of firms by market-based measure to be able 
to fulfil the requirement of stakeholder theory explained in the literature review. 
Using Tobin’s Q as a measuring indicator, a number of previous studies have proved 
that the adoption of equity-based compensation leads to increased productivity and 
by extension, Tobin’s Q of those companies.  The study of Sesil,Kroumova,Kruse 
and Blasi 2007; Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse and Blasi, (2000); both confirmed  that 
adoption of broad-based equity compensation results in higher Tobin’s Q. The same 
conclusion was made by Frye (2004) and Mehran 1995 of increase in firm 
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performance levels measured by Tobin’s Q due to granting of equity-based 
compensation. As a result, the following hypothesis will be tested:  
Hypothesis 2: There is positive relationship between broad-based equity 
compensation and Tobin’s Q of U.S. listed firms. 
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 RESEARCH DESIGN 5
This chapter deals with the procedure adopted in carrying out this research as a 
means of achieving the research objective. It begins with explanation of various 
proxies used as firm performance measures in addition to other firm characteristics 
affecting performance variables. Further, the population and sample, data collection 
in addition to the description of the method used for the data analysis are covered. It 
also addresses the basis for the regression models as well as explanation of the 
variables that are used in the analysis.  
5.1 Proxies for firm performance and broad-based equity compensation 
According to Neely, Gregory and Platts (1995), measuring the performance of an 
organisation means measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of actions taken 
within the firm. This means, a firm’s performance is closely related to its 
effectiveness. Organisational effectiveness simply refers to the absence of internal 
factors drawing back organisational goals, absence of mistakes, working towards 
appropriate organisational activities, and ensuring judicious use of resources towards 
acquisition of other business assets to achieve organisational goals (Cameron,1986). 
Organisational performance is regarded as a subset of organisational effectiveness 
and includes both operational and financial results. When it comes to financial 
performance, it is always used with reference to accounting numbers. According to 
Combs, Crook, and Shook (2005),82% of financial performance refers to accounting 
measures and profitability happens to be the most commonly used measure. Worthy 
to mention is the fact that, performance can also be measured in terms of growth. 
Measuring firm performance either in terms of growth or financial indicators are all 
economic perspectives. 
In measuring performance whether in terms of profitability or growth, it is equally 
important to note that, there could be other ways to measure this variable. This is 
where Freeman (1984) proposes the stakeholder theory of performance. This theory 
begins with identification of who the stakeholders are and what their expectations are 
in terms of performance measurement. The stakeholder view to firm performance 
goes beyond that of economic perspective to a social perspective. The economic 
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view always looks at value creation, but the social perspective looks at performance 
in terms of how well the interests of stakeholders are served which may not 
necessarily be a financial indicator. Freeman’s perspective will better be understood 
when the concept of stakeholder is defined. According to Freeman (1984, p.46), 
stakeholder refers to “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives”.  This includes individuals or entities 
within and outside the firm. Examples of stakeholders as cited by Donaldson and 
Preston (1995) are trade unions, communities, political groups and governmental 
agencies. Clarkson (1995) also mentions suppliers, shareholders, employees and 
customers as some other stakeholders. Because all these stakeholders have interests 
in firm performance, it is important to ensure that all their expectations are met. For 
instance, increased profitability, growth and market value are firm performance 
indicators which are of great importance to investors (Chakravarthy, 1986). 
Customers are interested in the firm’s ability to deliver goods and services that are in 
accordance with their specifications in terms of prices, tastes, quantity and so forth 
(Fornell, Johnson, Anderson, Cha, & Bryant, 1996). In the case of governments and 
communities as stakeholders, they will also measure firm performance using criteria 
such as product quality, giving employment opportunities to the less privileged, 
embarking upon social amenities, ethical business practices and protecting the 
environment (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
However, ensuring equal satisfaction of all the stakeholders will be a very daunting 
task to achieve. It is because of this dilemma that prioritisation of stakeholder 
demand becomes necessary in order to work towards attainment of the needed firm 
performance that will meet their expectations. In view of this, Mitchell, Agle and 
Wood (1997) believe there is the need to identify and prioritize according to the 
following criteria: the power the stakeholder wields over the firm, how legitimate are 
the claims of the stakeholder and how urgent are the demands of the stakeholder. 
Performance can also be measured by different dimensions and there are different 
indicators of performance as presented in the table below: 
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Table 1. Dimensions and indicators of firm performance (Adapted from Santos & 
Brito (2012) 
Dimensions  Selected Indicators  
  
Profitability  Return on Assets, EBTIDA margin, Return 
on investment, Net income/Revenues, 
Return on equity, Economic value added  
Market Value  Earnings per share, Stock price 
improvement, Dividend yield, Stock price 
volatility, Market value added (market 
value / equity), Tobin’s q (market value / 
replacement value of assets)  
Growth  Market-share growth, Asset growth, Net 
revenue growth, Net income growth, 
Number of employees growth  
Employee Satisfaction  Turn-over, Investments in employees 
development and training, Wages and 
rewards policies, Career plans, 
Organizational climate, General 
employees’ satisfaction  
Customer Satisfaction  Mix of products and services, Number of 
complaints, Repurchase rate, New 
customer retention, General customers’ 
satisfaction, Number of new 
products/services launched  
Environmental Performance  Number of projects to improve / recover 
the environment, Level of pollutants 
emission, Use of recyclable materials, 
Recycling level and reuse of residuals, 
Number of environmental lawsuits  
Social Performance  Employment of minorities, Number of 
social and cultural projects, Number of 
lawsuits filed by employees, customers and 
regulatory agencies  
  
Based on stakeholder theory by Freeman (1984) and Mitchell, Agle and Wood 
(1997) stakeholder prioritization criteria, this thesis will focus on two of the 
dimensions by Santos and Brito (2012); which are profitability and market value. 
From these dimensions, the measuring indicators that will be used are Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q. The stakeholder theory was chosen because according 
to Adams and Neely (2003), the core of organisational success hinges on the firm’s 
ability to meet the needs of stakeholders.  And the three stakeholders who have the 
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most legitimate claims and are able to contribute the most to influence firm 
performance are investors, customers and employees (Kaplan & Norton,1992). 
5.1.1 Return on Assets (ROA) 
The profitability dimension is usually measured by using net profit margin, Return 
on Assets and Return on Equity (Carey, 1974). The net income margin is simply the 
net income of the firm divided by net sales for the period. Return on Assets is 
defined as the total returns generated by a business to all of its stakeholders which 
include shareholders, governmental organisations, creditors and debenture holders 
(Pandey 2017).  Return on Assets, just like any other financial ratio is calculated 
slightly differently by different organisations but the interpretations remain the same. 
For instance, according to Dehning and Stratopoulos (2002) Return on Assets is 
calculated by dividing net income by total assets whereas Return on Equity is the 
ratio of an entity’s net income to the firm’s common equity. Pandey (2017) 
calculates ROA as follows: 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
∗ 100     (1) 
Where EBIT=Earnings Before Interests and Taxes 
There are a number of arguments in favour of the use of Return on Assets as firm 
performance measurement indicator. One of such arguments is from Schmidgall 
(2006), who believes ROA is able to indicate how much profit has really been 
generated from the total investment made. Also, Pandey (2017) indicated that, unlike 
ROE which accounts for returns to only equity shareholders, ROA takes into 
account, all other stakeholders in the organisation. This implies that, ROA is much 
broader in scope than ROE. It accounts for returns generated on assets from both 
long term and short sources. Further, by using ROA, a firm will be able to tell 
whether management is doing well in terms of amount of profit generated using the 
total assets at their disposal Schmidgall (2006). Another reason for using ROA is 
that, it can be divided into two parts under the DuPont composition. Historically, 
DuPont was the first organisation to use ROA in 1920 to determine the Return on 
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Assets used in farms (Pandey,2017). Several other studies have confirmed the 
viability of decomposing ROA. For instance, Dehning and Stratopoulos (2002), 
demonstrated that, the ROA can be decomposed into profitability and efficiency. By 
using ROA, it makes it possible to measure a firm’s performance from the 
perspective of efficiency and profitability concurrently, thereby showing the firm’s 
net profit margin and total assets turnover. The DuPont decomposition is as 
illustrated below by Dehning and Stratopoulos (2002) showing the relationship 
between Net Profit Margin (NPM), Total Assets Turnover (TAT) and the overall 
ROA: 
ROA = Net Income / Total assets = (Net Income / Sales) x (Sales / Total Assets) = 
NPM x TAT      (2) 
The Net Profit Margin (NPM) component measures the performance of the firm in 
terms of profitability while the Total Asset Turnover (TAT) indicates the level of 
efficiency with which assets of the company are being used. Because both 
components have effects of ROA, when net profit margin and total assets turnover 
increases, the ROA will increase. On the other hand, when both components 
decrease, ROA will also decrease. It must be noted that, when other variables remain 
unchanged, a change in sales alone will not result in any change in ROA. Rather, to 
be able to increase ROA, a firm must either increase the net income derived from a 
particular asset or be able to increase net income from the use of fewer assets. This 
study will rely on ROA due to its ability to measure both the level of efficiency and 
profitability of the firm. 
Further, according to Hagel,Brown, Samoylova and Lui (2013) ROA provides 
explanation on how much profit is generated on every single amount of dollar 
invested by shareholders and therefore serves as a measure of income that the 
shareholder’s funds have generated. Another argument in favour of ROA is that, 
unlike ROE which creates wealth only for equity shareholders, the former creates 
wealth for all the stakeholders in a company (Pandey,2017) which is consistent with 
the stakeholder theory of Freeman (1984). 
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Also, the major weakness of ROE as accounting measure is the fact that, it does not 
recognize leverage which makes it incomplete in assessing the overall performance 
of the firm because firms are financed with both debt and equity. On the other hand, 
ROA provides a more balanced measure of accounting performance because it is 
able to account for the risk that arises from leverage which ROE fails to. There is a 
direct relationship between leverage and assets (Hagel,Brown,Samoylova & Lui, 
2013). Therefore, when leverage increases, asset value also increases. If assets are 
put to good use, ROA increases and if assets are not put to productive use, ROA 
decreases. These provide the basis for the preference of ROA over ROE as 
accounting performance measure.   
Finally, a number of previous studies have used ROA as firm performance indicator. 
First of all, Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse and Blasi (2000) compared the performance of 
companies that award broad-based stock options to their employees as compared to 
companies that do not offer broad-based stock options to their employees. Frye 
(2004) also used ROA as proxy for firm long-term performance in a study on equity- 
based compensation for employees and how that affect firm performances. This 
study will adopt the formula used by Dehning and Stratopoulos (2002) where ROA is 
calculated as net income divided by total assets.  
5.1.2 Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q was named after James Tobin though historical records indicate that, the 
theoretical framework for this macroeconomic variable was jointly developed by 
James Tobin and William C Brainard all of Yale University (Bartlett & 
Partnoy,2018). The original theoretical framework developed in 1968 which 
underpinned the Tobin’s Q was that, “the market valuation of equities, relative to the 
replacement cost of the physical assets they represent, is the major determinant of 
investment.” (Bartlett & Partnoy,2018).  For that matter, there is the high possibility 
of investing in an entity’s assets when capital has higher value in the market than it 
actually costs to produce in the same market. On the other hand, the possibility of 
investing in an entity’s assets is low when the value of capital is lower than how 
much it costs to replace. 
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Since its inception many years ago, scholars in the areas of finance and law have 
used this as proxy to measure firm performance in numerous studies. Over three 
hundred law review articles in corporate and security laws have used Tobin’s Q as 
proxy for firm performance and has also featured in hundreds of peer review in both 
finance and economic journals (Bartlett & Partnoy,2018). Though it was originally 
intended to be used as model for determining investment behavior, it has become an 
acceptable indicator for measuring firm performance. For instance, in manufacturing 
industries, a number of reasons have been assigned for its usage. According to Chung 
and Pruitt (1994), manufacturing industries have widely adopted the Tobin’s Q for a 
number of reasons such as: 
(a) analysis of cross-sectional differences when making both investment and 
diversification decisions 
(b) the effect of equity ownership by managers in organisations and how it 
affects performances of those firms  
(c)  the relationship between managerial performance and tender offer gains, 
investment opportunities and tender offer responses  
(d)  when making financing, dividend, as well as when making policies 
regarding compensation schemes 
Tobin’s Q is used to indicate whether a firm has been undervalued, overvalued or 
fairly valued. To be able to determine the extent of valuation, it depends on the 
relationship between a firm’s market value and its intrinsic value. Where the market 
value simply refers to how much the assets of a company are worth whereas the 
intrinsic value refers to the perceived value of the firm. The Tobin’s Q is usually 
measured on a scale of 0 to 1. The ratio between 0 to 1 means the firm is 
undervalued. What it simply means is that, it costs more to replace the assets of the 
company than the cost of its stock. On the other hand, the firm is said to be 
overvalued when the Tobin’s Q is higher than 1. This also means that, the firm’s 
assets is worth more than it costs to replace the assets of the firm. In simple terms, 
the theory of the Tobin’s is that, if Q is greater than one (1), then it means additional 
investment in the firm is worth it. Because, the cost of investment will be less than 
the profit generated by those investments. If it is less than 1, it will be better to sell 
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the assets of the company. The ideal state where the firm is at equilibrium is when 
Tobin’s Q is equal to 1. 
As a result, the Tobin’s Q just like accounting ratios, has been calculated differently 
by different authors but the results and interpretations remain the same. Here are a 
few mathematical expressions of this performance measuring indicator.  Ali,Mahmud 
and Lima (2016) define it as a comparison of the market value of the firm and its 
replacement value and is given as: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒+𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒+𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
    (3) 
Source: Ali,Mahmud and Lima (2016) 
Wolfe, Carlos and Sauaia (2005) define Tobin’s Q as the ratio of a firm’s market 
value and its replacement cost. In simple terms, it means dividing the firm’s market 
value by the total replacement cost of its assets.   
(𝑀𝑆𝑉+𝑀𝑉𝐷)
𝑅𝑉𝐴
      (4) 
Where: 
MSV = market value of company’s outstanding stock 
MVD = market value of all of a firm’s debts 
RVA = replacement cost of the firm’s production capacity 
Source: Wolfe, Carlos and Sauaia (2005) 
The Tobin’s Q has been used in different sectors as well to measure the value of 
firms. For instance, in a study conducted by Ali,Mahmud and Lima (2016),it was 
used as performance indicator to measure the market value of banks in Bangladesh. 
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Similarly, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) used Tobin’s Q as a non-accounting performance 
measure when assessing the impact of board composition on firm performance.  
Tobin’s Q is used in tandem with ROA because it is often affected by external 
factors which are beyond the control of executives of the companies. The reason is 
that,the external business environment is beyond the control of the executives of 
companies. As a result, firm performances as indicated by market remains very 
reliable because those measures are devoid of manipulations through practices such 
as earnings management. Further, Fisher and McGowan (1983) have argued that 
accounting rate of performance measure provides inadequate measure of firm 
performance as compared to market-based measures. Finally, accounting 
performance measures are used together with market-based measures because while 
accounting-based performance measures are historically oriented, financial market-
based performance indicator (Tobin’s Q) is both current and future performance 
indicator.  
The use of Return On Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q in this study as proxies for 
accounting and market-based performance measures is consistent with Hillegeist and 
Penalva (2003), Mehran (1995), Core et al (1990), Wright and Matolcsy (2011), 
Elayan, Lau and Meyer (2003), Højen (2007), and Sesil, Kroumova, Kruse and Blasi 
(2000).  
5.1.3 Change in fair value of stock options granted 
Having looked at these firm performance indicators and how they will be calculated, 
how the proxy for equity-based compensation will be determined is equally worth 
considering. This study will use change in fair value of stock options granted as 
proxy for broad-based equity compensation and will follow the approach of Ofek and 
Yermack (2000) in calculating the change in options granted with a slight 
modification. Stock options will be determined by calculating the change in fair 
value of the options granted scaled by total assets as follows: 
𝛥OPTFVGR =
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑉𝐺𝑅1−𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑉𝐺𝑅0
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑉𝐺𝑅0 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠1
    (5) 
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Where:𝛥OPTFVGR is the change in fair value of stock options 
granted,𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑉𝐺𝑅1is the fair value of the options granted for the current year and 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑉𝐺𝑅0 is the fair value of the options granted for the previous year. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠1 represents total assets for the current year. 
5.2 Other firm characteristics affecting ROA and Tobin’s Q 
Having looked at various dimensions and indicators of firm performances,it is 
equally imperative to consider what other factors really drive market-based and 
financial performances of companies aside from equity-based compensation. 
Hillegeist and Penalva (2003) have indicated that, there are other firm characteristics 
that equally affect firm performances. In a study conducted by Demirhan and Anwar 
(2014),it was found that the leverage and liquidity affect financial performances of 
companies in Turkey. Similarly, Deitiana and Habibuw (2015) were able to confirm 
that,leverage and liquidity are able to influence performances of companies. A firm’s 
leverage refers to the extent to which companies borrow in order to enhance their 
profitability.  Because, firms need to maintain manageable level of debt financing of 
their activities in order to remain profitable (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Leverage 
can affect the performance of companies positively or negatively. According to 
Jensen (1986),when a company has high level of leverage,it limits the ability of 
management to use free cash flows to engage in value destruction activities. 
Similarly,when firms have high leverage ratios,it affects their ability to raise more 
debt financing to carry out value creating activities and has been used as control 
variable in previous studies (Jensen 1986; Myers, 1977; Agrawal, & 
Knoeber,1996).This has also been confirmed by a number of studies that as leverage 
increases, profitability falls and this leads to negative effect on return on assets 
(Deloof 2003; Kebewar 2013;Enqvist, Graham, & Nikkinen,2014). The leverage of 
the firm which is given by Basu, Hwang, Mitsudome and Weintrop (2007) and 
Matolcsy,Shan,Seethamraju (2012) as:  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
      (6) 
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A firm’s liquidity is equally important in measuring its ability to pay for its short-
term debts when they fall due (Keown et al. 2011) as inability to do so is an 
indication of insolvency (Black 2009, p.183). Liquidity has the tendency to affect the 
operational performances of companies and their very survival, growth and risk level 
especially during bad economic conditions (Jose, Lancaster, & Stevens,1996). This 
equally implies that, there is a relationship between liquidity and the financial health 
of organisations. Fang,Noe and Tice (2009) have also held that,liquidity promotes 
good investment decisions as that helps in minimizing opportunistic behaviour by 
management. If liquidity helps minimize opportunistic behavior,then it is anticipated 
that,this will affect firm performance since it also indicates efficient contracting. 
Liquidity is given by Keown,Martin and Petty (2011,pp. 90-91) as : 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
     (7) 
According to Hillegeist and Penalva (2003), there are some vector characteristics of 
firms that affect firm value measured by Tobin’s Q including size of the firm and 
growth opportunities. Similarly, Shin and Stulz (2000) found that growth 
opportunities affect firm performance because, the more options a firm has to grow, 
the more sales is made and that affects the firm’s total earnings and market value. 
Positive relationship between growth opportunities and firm profitability has also 
been confirmed by Shin and Soenen (1998) and García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 
(2007).  Growth opportunities will be determined according to the firm’s sales 
growth which is consistent with Diaz and Hindro (2017) and is given as: 
𝑆𝐺 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠1−𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠0
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠0 
     (8) 
Where 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠1 = Current year sales values and 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠0 represents lagged year sales 
values. 
SG=Sales growth  
Chaudhuri, Khumbakar and Sundaram (2016) have indicated that, firm size affects 
the performances of companies which is determined by the total assets of the firm 
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(Kuo,Li & Yu, 2013). Koch and McGrath (1996) have also indicated that, large firms 
have the ability to widen their scope of operation, thereby increasing the firm 
performances. It is therefore expected that, the size of the firm has a positive impact 
on the performance of organizations. 
Age of the firm has also been found to have effect on performances of companies in 
several studies. Sorensen & Stuart (2000) found that organisations become more 
inflexible over time when they become very old due to existence of organisational 
inertia and affects their performances negatively. On the contrary, Liargovas and 
Skandalis (2008) assert that, because old firms have been in existence for long, they 
have learned enough from the environment and have become more experienced and 
know how to deal with challenges that confront them than new firms. As a result, old 
age leads to improved performance of organisations. Additionally, Loderer,  Neusser, 
and Waelchli, (2009) found that as firms increase in age,their performances decline 
in terms of Return on Assets and Tobin’s Q and that firms rather do better when they 
are young. This study will apply age of the firm as defined by Shin and Stulz (2000), 
as the number of years during which the firm has had its data in the CRSP database: 
CRSP, log (Firm Age)     (9) 
The last factor to consider in this study is a firm’s ROA. Because this is an 
accounting- based variable, it can also affect the market-based performance measure 
of firms. This has been confirmed by Alghifari,Triharjono and Juhaeni (2013) 
indicated that,while other factors account for 85.4% variations in a firm’s Tobin’s 
Q,the remaining 14.6% is accounted for by the firms’ ROA. This indicates a 
significant effect of ROA on the firm’s market-based performance. Variables that are 
expressed in natural logarithms are in line with previous studies (Duffhues & Kabir, 
2008; Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006).From the foregoing, the following five 
predictions are made based on other firm characteristics: 
Prediction 1. Leverage has negative relationship with ROA  
Prediction 2. Liquidity has positive relationship with ROA  
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Prediction 3. Growth opportunities has positive relationship with ROA and Tobin’s 
Q 
Prediction 4. Age of the firm has positive relationship with ROA and Tobin’s Q 
Prediction 5. Firm size has positive relationship with ROA and Tobin’s Q 
5.3 Data 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009, p.212) define population as the total number of 
cases out of which a sample is drawn whereas sample is regarded as the number of 
cases chosen out of the population from which data will be gathered and 
generalization will be made to represent the views of the population. The target 
population for this study comprises of companies listed in the U.S. stock market. 
Companies used for the study are from different industries such as energy, retail, 
information and communication technology, hotel, healthcare, transport, aerospace, 
utilities, manufacturing, and automobile, banking, insurance and so forth.  
Secondary sources of data will be relied upon to carry out the analysis. Data used for 
this study are related to publicly traded companies in the U.S and are obtained 
directly from Center for Research and in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat 
database from 2011 to 2015. Data on stock options are obtained from the database as 
proxy for all equity-based compensations. The original dataset comprised of a total 
of 36,844 observations. Data related to firms that had missing values were deleted. 
Missing values were in respect of those from companies that had end of fiscal year 
stock prices but missing values in the financial statements. After trimming the data, it 
came down to a total of 2064 firm observations. Variables obtained from these 
companies were in respect of net income, total assets, total liabilities, current 
liabilities, current assets, total debts, age of the firm, stock prices, shares outstanding, 
sales, number of stock options granted, and total shareholder equity. While total 
assets and net income served as the inputs for the Return of Assets (ROA) 
computations, total liabilities, stock prices, shares outstanding and total shareholder 
equity served as inputs for the Tobin’s Q computations. 
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This study uses the date on which the equity compensation was granted. The grant 
date of the equity-based compensation is used instead of the exercise date due to a 
number of reasons: 
First, this is consistent with the study of Frye (2004) in a study on the equity-based 
compensation for employees. Again, Ikäheimo et al (2004) have indicated that, 
announcement of equity-based grant to workers is received by the shareholders in 
particular that agency problem is being addressed. As a result, it is an indication that, 
employees and management are being motivated to take decisions in the best interest 
of shareholders. In line with the same argument, Yermack (1997b) indicated that, 
management in particular grant stock options in anticipation of good company 
performance. By so doing, they grant the options at a time when the stock price is 
usually low in order to set the set strike price at a favourable level where they will 
maximize the gains in future. Related to that is the argument by Carlin and Ford 
(2005), that, equity-based compensations are often granted at a time that preceeds 
disclosure of bad news in a bid to decrease the strike price and at a time when stock 
prices are particularly low. So the timing of equity-grant is as important as the 
motives behind granting such compensation system. 
Finally, Larcker (1983) has also indicated that, first time announcement of adoption 
of equity compensation results in positive stock market reaction. Since the market 
perceive such compensation announcement as good news, other things being equal, it 
should lead to improvement in firm performance measured in terms of Tobin’s Q. 
5.4 Regression model for Return on Assets (ROA) 
To be able to know the effect of equity-based compensation on firm performance, the 
hypothesis developed in chapter four (4) together with the predictions of chapter five 
(5) will be tested using simple linear regression. Equations 9 and 10 are used to test 
the relationship between stock options and firm performances measured by Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q where each of the two proxies of firm performance are 
dependent variables. 
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To be able to answer hypotheses one (1) and two (2), the two regression models used 
are based on the modified version of Duffhues and Kabir (2008) in studying the 
relationship between compensation and firm performance and will be extended to 
cover variables employed by Diaz and Hindro (2017) in measuring ROA. Therefore, 
to be able to test hypothesis one (1), ROA is regressed on option compensation and 
other variables as follows: 
ROAi t = β1 ΔOPTFVGR i t + β2LIQi t + β3SIZEi t + β4LEVi t + β5GROWTHi t + 
β6AGEi t+ εi t                     (10)
                        
Where ROAi is the return on assets on firm i at time t, β1 ΔOPTFVGR i t is the 
change in fair value of options granted by firm i at time t, β2LIQi t is the liquidity of 
firm i at time t, β3SIZEi t is the size of firm i at time t, β4LEVi t is the leverage of 
firm i at time t , β5GROWTHi t is the growth opportunities of firm i at time t, + 
β6AGEi t is the age of firm i at time t, and εi t is the error term. 
5.5 Regression model for Tobin’s Q 
In order to measure the performances of companies on the basis of market value and 
their book value, the following regression model has been developed in order to test 
the hypothesis 2:  
TBQi t = β1 ΔOPTFVGR i t + β2GROWTHi t + β3SIZEi t + β4ROAi t+ β5AGEi t 
+εi t                              (11) 
Where TBQi is the Tobin’s Q of firm i at time t, β1 ΔOPTFVGR i t is the change in 
fair value of options granted by firm i at time t, β2GROWTHi t is the growth 
opportunities of firm i at time t, β3SIZEi t is the size of firm i at time t, β4ROAi t is 
the return on assets of firm i at time t, β5AGEi t is the age of firm i at time t, and εi t 
is the error term. 
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5.6 Dependent variables 
In the case of firm performance, there are several other indicators of firm 
performances as shown from the literature review section (Table 1), but this study 
will use ROA and Tobin’s Q and these two will serve as dependent variables. 
5.7 Independent variables 
Because this study is based on the how equity-based compensation affects firm 
performance, equity-based compensation serves as the independent variable and 
equity-based compensation is proxied by stock options.  
Apart from that, there are several factors that affect the performances of companies 
as explained under 5.2. In view of this, it is necessary to include these as independent 
variables which are capable of affecting the dependent variables, being the firm 
performance. These other variables in this study are liquidity, firm size, leverage, 
growth opportunities, and age of the firm. The table below summarizes the various 
variables used in this study.
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Table 2. Summary of variables description (Adapted from Diaz and Hindro (2017)) 
Variable 
 
Abbreviation  Description Formula 
Return on 
assets 
ROA Proxy for 
profitability 
Net income/Total assets 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 
TBQ Proxy for market 
based 
performance 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
 
Change in fair 
value of 
options 
granted 
ΔOPTFVGR Proxy for equity-
based 
compensation 
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑉𝐺𝑅1 − 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑉𝐺𝑅0
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐹𝑉𝐺𝑅0 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠1
 
 
Size 
 
LOG_TA 
 
Natural 
logarithm of 
total assets 
 
Log (Total assets) 
Liquidity LIQ Measure of firm 
ability to pay 
short term debts 
Current assets / Current liabilities 
Leverage LEV Percentage of 
assets financed 
from debts  
Total debts / Total Assets 
Growth SG Growth 
opportunities 
𝑆𝐺 =
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠1 − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠0
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠0 
 
 
AGE LOG_AGE Number of years 
a firm has had its 
data in CRSP 
 CRSP, log (Firm Age) 
 
 
    
Based on the above explanations, the following model has been developed indicating 
the direction and the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variables: 
61 
 
Figure 1. Model of the hypothesized relationships 
 
The figure above shows that, apart from firm size, change in fair value of stock 
options granted, growth opportunities and age of the firm which affect both ROA and 
Tobin’s Q, liquidity and leverage are other independent variables that affect only 
ROA while ROA also serves as the other variable affecting only Tobin’s Q.  
 
 
62 
 EMPIRICAL AND DATA ANALYSIS 6
Table 3.Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
LEVERAGE 2064 0.017 17.266 0.568 0.722 
LIQ 2064 0.012 31.915 2.821 2.638 
Log_Age 2064 1.609 4.174 2.860 0.678 
LOG_TA 2064 1.867 14.105 7.663 2.245 
ROA 2064 -10.142 0.734 -0.108 0.493 
SG 2064 -0.971 26.592 1.062 3.694 
TOBIN_Q 2064 0.427 3190.242 13.631 80.371 
ΔOPTFVGR  2064 -4.087 3.968 0.001 0.208 
The table 3 above shows the multivariate statistics of the variables. In order to reduce 
the impact of outliers on regression coefficients, all the variables are winsorized by 
setting the values in the top one percentile to the highest values of the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles. As can be seen from the data, the maximum value for ROA was 0.734 
while the minimum was -10.142. The possible explanation for the negative figure is 
that, not all included firms made profits over the five-year period covered by the 
study. In the case of Tobin’s Q, while the minimum was 0.427, the maximum was 
3,190.242 This means while some of the companies are undervalued, others are 
highly overvalued and can be confirmed from the level of standard deviation of 
80.371. In terms of the firm size measured by log(total assets),the minimum was 
1.867 while the maximum value was 14.102. Looking at the standard deviation of 
2.245, it could be seen that the companies are not significantly dispersed from the 
mean in terms of size, and this is also confirmed by the value of the mean size of 
7.663. In terms of leverage, while some of the companies had very low level of debt 
financing represented by a minimum of 0.017, the maximum stood at 17.266 which 
is also due to the fact that, the sample companies come from different industries. 
Because some industries require higher level of gearing ratio than others. The extent 
of liquidity among the sample companies was equally highly dispersed from the 
mean value as the standard deviation stood at 2.638 while the minimum and 
maximum were 0.012 and 31.915 respectively. This is also due to the fact that, some 
industries require more current assets than others, particularly those in the 
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merchandise industry as compared to those operating in service industries. Finally, 
some of the firms increased the number of stock options granted over the period 
while others decreased the number of stock options granted, with the minimum 
number being -4.087 while the maximum number stood at 3.968. 
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6.1 ROA and Tobin’s Q Evidence 
Table 4.Pearson correlation results of variables 
 LEVERAGE LIQ Log_Age LOG_TA ROA TOBIN_Q ΔOPTFVGR SG 
LEVERAGE  1        
         
         
LIQ  -0.260
**
 1       
 (0.000)        
         
Log_Age  0.003 -0.061
**
 1      
 (0.894) (0.006)       
         
LOG_TA  -0.133
**
 -0.176
**
 0.256
**
 1     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)      
         
ROA  -0.687
**
 0.042 0.143
**
 0.473
**
 1    
 (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000)     
         
TOBIN_Q  0.567
**
 -0.026 -0.020 -0.158
**
 -0.626
**
 1   
 (0.000) (0.237) (0.361) (0.000) (0.000)    
         
ΔOPTFVGR  -0.130
**
 0.011 -0.010 0.023 0.210
**
 -0.301
**
 1  
 (0.000) (0.628) (0.659) (0.288) (0.000) (0.000)   
         
SG  0.010 0.111
**
 -0.212
**
 -0.149
**
 -0.165
**
 0.087
**
 0.133
**
 1 
 (0.639) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
         
N  2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 
N=number of observations,t-values in parentheses,**= 0.01 significance level (2-tailed). 
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The correlation analysis in the table (4) above precedes the regression analysis to be 
able to show the relationships between the two dependent variables (ROA and 
Tobin’s Q) and the independent variables. For the purpose of this study, the pivotal 
issue for discussion will be how ROA and Tobin’s Q are correlated with other 
independent variables. The first dependent variable to be addressed is ROA which 
will be followed by Tobin’s Q. 
From the table above, change in fair value of options granted (ΔOPTFVGR) has a 
statistically significant linear relationship with Return on Assets (ROA) with a 
coefficient (r) of 0.210 with (p < 0.01). The direction of the relationship is positive, 
indicating that change in fair value of options granted (ΔOPTFVGR) and Return on 
Assets (ROA) are positively correlated. This indicates that, when a firm grants more 
options, its performance in terms of ROA increases. The magnitude, or strength, of 
the association however is weak or small (0.1 < | r | < 0.3).  
There is a negative correlation between sales growth and firms’ Return on Assets 
(ROA) with coefficient of -0.165 and p-value less than 0.01 while a positive 
correlation was recorded between size of firms and their performances with 
coefficient of 0.473 and this relationship is statistically significant with p<0.01. 
Unlike the change in fair value of options granted and growth opportunities which 
have weak correlations with ROA, large firm size is moderately associated with 
ROA (3 < | r | < .5). This suggests that, as firms grow in terms of assets, they tend to 
perform better than younger firms with little amount of assets at their disposal. 
Just like size, age of firms is also positively correlated with ROA with coefficient of 
0.143 and is statistically significant (p < 0.01). The strength of this relationship is 
equally weak (0.01 < | r | < 0.3). This is an indication that, old age of firms leads to 
improved performance in terms of ROA. 
Leverage has a negative correlation as expected because as firm’s leverage 
decreases, it increases management’s ability to borrow to embark on value creating 
activities leading to an increase in firm performance by way of ROA. Leverage’s 
coefficient of -0.687 is equally statistically significant with p< 0.01. 
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Firms’ level of liquidity is equally associated with high performance in terms of 
ROA because there is a positive but weak correlation between the two with 
coefficient of 0.042 at p<0.01. Regardless of the weak correlation, this is statistically 
significant. This indicates that, as firms’ liquidity improves, they are able to increase 
returns on total assets (ROA) and hence performances of the companies are 
enhanced. 
From the same table (4) above, there is a negative correlation between ROA and 
Tobin’s Q of firms with coefficient of -0.626 at 1% significance level. Similarly, 
large firm size(Log_TA) and age (Log_Age) of the firm are equally associated with 
lower Tobin’s Q, having coefficients of -0.158 and -0.020 respectively at 1% 
significance level. While size of the firm is statistically significant (p=0.000), age of 
the firm is statistically insignificant (p=0.361). Just like ROA, the fair value of stock 
options granted is negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q of firms with coefficient of -
0.301 at 1% significance level.  
Finally, growth opportunities (SG) of firms is positively correlated with Tobin’s Q 
with coefficient of 0.087 and is statistically significant with (p < 0.01). This is also 
an indication that, as firms have more opportunities to expand their operations, more 
sales are made which results in improvement in market-based performance measures 
of the firms. Based on the above evidence, it can be seen that all the other variables 
except growth opportunities have negative correlation with a firm’s performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q. 
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6.2 Regression analysis of the hypothesis test for ROA and Tobin’s Q  
Table 5.Regression results  
Dependent variables: ROA Tobin’s Q 
 
(A) (B) 
Constant 
-0.477** 
(0.000) 
-54.834** 
(0.000) 
ROA 
 
-108.363** 
(0.000) 
SG 
-0.015** 
(0.000) 
0.684 
(0.068) 
ΔOPTFVGR 
0.321** 
(0.000) 
-65.058** 
(0.000) 
Log-age 
0.021 
(0.037) 
4.767 
(0.020) 
Log-TA 
0.078** 
(0.000) 
5.541** 
(0.000) 
Liquidity 
-0.009** 
(0.001)  
LEVERAGE 
-0.432** 
(0.000)  
 
N 2064 2064 
R-Squared 0.651 0.444 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.650 0.443 
F-Statistic 640.253** 328.884** 
   
N=number of observations,R-Squared=Extent of variation in dependent variables (ROA and Tobin’s Q) 
explained by independent variables (ROA,SG, ΔOPTFVGR,Log-age,Log-TA,Liquidity and 
LEVERAGE),**=Significance of coefficient at  0.01 level 
Beginning with column (A) of table 5, the results under column (A) above indicate 
that overall, the independent variables in formula 10 explain 65% of changes in 
Return on Assets (ROA). The F-statistic also shows that the model’s independent 
variables is significant in predicting changes in the dependent variable with p=0.000. 
While other variables which have not been included in this study are accountable for 
35% of the changes in a firm’s Return on Assets, the independent variables which are 
changes in fair value of options granted, liquidity, firm age, firm size, growth 
opportunities and leverage (ΔOPTFVGR,LIQ,LOG_AGE,LOG_TA,SG and 
LEVERAGE), significantly represent the model used in this study.  It can equally be 
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seen that, there is a significant positive impact of changes in fair value of options 
granted on Return on Assets with coefficient (b)=0.321 and p=0.000. Again, firms’ 
liquidity had negative and significant impact on their performances measured by 
ROA with (b=-0.009, p=0.001). The total amount of assets at the disposal of firms 
also affects performances of those companies as larger firms are able to do better 
than smaller firms. Firm sizes represented by Log_TA has b=0.078 and p=0.000. 
Next is the leverage of the firms which also shows that, as firms reduce their gearing 
ratio, they are able to borrow more to embark upon value creating activities and this 
equally attracts investors and creditors to invest and sell on credit to those companies 
which enhances their performances. Leverage was expected to have a negative 
association with ROA and it equally shows a coefficient (b) of -0.432 and is 
statistically significant (p=0.000).  
On the contrary, growth opportunities do not necessarily lead to increased ROA with 
b=-0.015 and p=0.000. This is equally not in accordance with what was predicted but 
is in consonance with a study by Margaretha and Supartika (2015) which indicated 
that growth opportunities impact profitability negatively. And so if profitability falls, 
then ROA will not necessarily rise.  
Finally, old firms have also been confirmed not to suffer from organization inertia 
and rather stand better chance of recording higher performances than young or new 
ones. Age of the firm represented by Log_Age has (b=0.021) showing a positive 
impact on firm performance but is statistically insignificant at p=0.037. Based on the 
results of column (A) above, the regression model for ROA is fitted as follows: 
ROAit=-0.477+0.321(ΔOPTFVGR)-0.009(LIQ)+0.078(Log_TA)-0.432(LEVERAG 
E)-0.015(SG)+ 0.021(Log_Age) 
The regression model above indicates that, out of the six independent variables, five 
have significant impact on performances of firms by way of ROA. These variables 
with the most significant impact on ROA are change in fair value of options granted 
(ΔOPTFVGR), size of the firm (LOG_TA), leverage (LEVERAGE), age of the firm 
(Log_Age) and growth opportunities (SG). 
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Now to column (B) of table 5, the results under column (B) above indicates that, 
overall, the independent variables in formula 11 explain 44.40% of changes in 
Tobin’s Q. Regardless of the lower percentage in comparison with that of ROA 
regression model, the F-statistic also shows that it is statistically significant. As such, 
while other variables which have not been included in this study are accountable for 
55.60% of the changes in a firm’s Tobin’s Q, the independent variables included in 
this study which are Return on Assets, firm size, fair value of options granted, 
growth opportunities and age of the firm (ROA,Log_TA, ΔOPTFVGR, SG, 
LOG_AGE),significantly represent the model used in this study. Further, the results 
indicate that, higher Return on Assets (ROA) is associated with lower performance 
by way of Tobin’s Q (b=-108.363) and is statistically significant (p=0.000). Of 
equally important is the growth opportunities of companies. Companies with more 
growth opportunities are able to perform well in terms of Tobin’s Q which shows 
(b=0.684) but is statistically insignificant (p=0.068). Moreso, options granted affect 
firms’ market-based performance negatively with (b=-65.058) and is statistically 
significant (p=0.000). The same cannot be said of the remaining two predictors 
which are age (Log_Age) of the firms and their sizes (Log_TA) with (b=4.767, 
p=0.020) and (b=5.541, p=0.000) respectively. These also show that, larger firms are 
able to perform better because they have more resources to carry out value adding 
investments and firms which have been in existence for long have learned enough 
from their past mistakes and are able to take prudent decisions leading to improved 
performances of such companies which is equally not a deviation from expectations. 
Based on the results of column (B) above, the regression model is fitted as follows: 
TBQ = -54.834 - 65.058(ΔOPTFVGR) + 0.684(SG) +5.541 (LOG_TA) -
108.363(ROA)+ 4.767(LOG_AGE) 
Referring to the regression table and the model above, it can be clearly seen that, out 
of the five independent variables, the  most significant variables affecting firms’ 
Tobin’s Q are the Return on Assets (ROA),fair value of options granted 
(ΔOPTFVGR), and firm size (LOG_TA) showing b=-108.363,p=0.000,b=-
65.058,p=0.000 and b=5.541,p=0.000 respectively. The remaining two variables 
which are growth opportunities (SG) and firm age (Log_Age) are statistically 
insignificant. 
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 CONCLUSION 7
This study was conducted to analyse how broad-based equity compensation affects 
performances of selected listed firms in the U.S.  On one hand, two proxies were 
used for firm performances, namely Return on Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q 
representing accounting and market-based performance measures respectively. On 
the other hand, fair value of stock options granted was used as proxy for broad-based 
equity compensation. 
The results of the study supported one of the hypotheses while the other was not 
supported as far as the effect of stock options granted on firm performances is 
concerned.  Fair value of stock options granted was found to have a positive impact 
on firms’ accounting performances measured by ROA. This was in accordance with 
the expectations and was statistically significant. However, it is in contrast with the 
result of Frye (2004) which concluded, equity compensation rather had negative 
relationship with firm performance measured in terms of ROA. In the same vein, 
Sanders and Hambrick (2007) concluded that, granting of stock options lead to more 
losses in firms than gains. Their coefficient of losses recorded for ROA was found to 
be as twice as the gains made, hence companies record poor performances in terms 
of ROA when stock options are granted. Nonetheless, the result of this study is in 
agreement with several other studies. For example, Sesil,Kroumova,Kruse and Blasi 
(2000) found that broad-based equity compensation has a positive relationship with 
firm performances by way of ROA. Further, unlike Ikäheimo, Kjellman , Holmberg 
and Jussila (2004) who concluded that offering of stock options to employees lead to 
negative outcome where free rider problem was cited as a possible reason for this 
negative out-turn, this study agrees with Duffhues,Kabir,Mertens and Roosenboom 
(2002) who concluded that, granting stock options lead to increase in performances 
of companies by way of ROA for reasons such as ability to attract and retain 
qualified employees, accounting and tax purposes and the alignment of principal-
agents interests. Similarly, Hochberg and Lindsey (2010), concluded that broad-
based equity compensation does not lead to free rider problem due to mutual 
monitoring and that such compensation programmes lead to increase in adjusted 
ROA of firms. Also, this result concurs with the findings of Hillegeist and Penalva 
(2003) who found a positive association between firm performance in terms of ROA 
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and the amount of options held by both executives and non-executives in those 
organisations, indicating  that as equity-based compensations are targeted at all and 
sundry, companies tend to do well using ROA as accounting- based performance 
indicator. Finally, this provides evidence that firm performance by way of ROA will 
not only improve when equity compensation is targeted at executives only 
(Mehran,1995) but also when it is broad-based. 
 
On the other hand, fair value of stock options was found to have a negative impact on 
market-based performances of firms measured by Tobin’s Q. This outcome is in 
contrast with expectations but is consistent with previous studies such as 
Liljeblom,Pasternack and Rosenberg (2010) who concluded that, the negative 
association between stock options granted and the performances of companies in 
terms of Tobin’s Q is as a result of the fact that, poor performing companies are the 
ones that tend to issue more stock options. It also shows that, when companies’ 
market-based performance is falling, they issue stock options as a means of 
addressing the agent-principal problem by making agents part owners to avoid 
further decline of market-based performances. Also, Pasternack and Rosenberg 
(2003) found that, the amount of equity ownership which is as a result of stock 
options granted is negatively related to Tobin’s Q which also indicates that, though 
the determinants of broad-based stock options and those targeted at specific group 
differ, the Tobin’s Q does not increase as a result of adoption of stock options. Also, 
Faleye,Mehrotra and Morck (2005) recorded a rather significant decline in 
shareholder value measured by Tobin’s Q when employees in general are given a 
voice in corporate governance affairs through stock options indicating negative 
relationship between such compensation programmes and firm performances.  
 
Kim and Ouimet (2014)  concluded that, when organisation adopts broad-based 
equity compensation,because a lot of employees are benefiting from the scheme,it  
results in free rider problem and further argues that such programmes are for 
purposes such as avoidance of takeovers by building strong alliance between 
management and employees and not necessarily for the alignment of principal and 
agent interests. On this note, we conclude that firm performances rather decline in 
terms of Tobin’s Q when broad-based equity compensations are implemented due to 
factors such as building of alliances between management and employees, free rider 
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problems and the use of stock options for purposes other than market-based 
performance improvements. 
 
Referring to the regression result, apart from stock options, other firm characteristics 
were found to have significant impact on firm performances. Notable among these 
characteristics is the size of the firm. The firm size showed consistent results for the 
two dependent variables. The result for ROA is in accordance with expectations 
because the more assets a firm has, the more the firm can take advantage of 
investment opportunities to increase its productivity and higher productivity leads to 
improved profitability and enhanced ROA.  This result is in line with previous 
studies such as Diaz and Hindro (2017). Not only are firms found to improve their 
accounting-based performance on the basis of their size, but their market-based 
performances also increased and was equally significant just like the accounting-
based performances as can be seen from the regression results. Firm leverage was 
equally found to have a significant impact on performances in terms of ROA. The 
negative association between leverage and ROA indicates that, as firms’ leverage 
falls, they are able to have room to borrow more money if needed to carry out more 
value adding activities. This result is consistent with Simerly and Li (2000) and 
Omondi and Muturi (2013).  This also supports the view that, leverage affects 
liquidity of firms as the two are inversely correlated as can be seen from the 
correlation results. As such, as leverage falls, it is an indication of increasing 
liquidity and this will affect ROA positively (Mayasari, 2012). Consequently, firms’ 
liquidity was also found to have a positive and significant correlation with the ROA 
which is also consistent with Diaz and Hindro (2017) that, as firms have more cash and 
cash equivalents available, they are able to generate profit and increased profitability will 
lead to improvement in ROA. There were contrasting results with regards to how 
growth opportunities affect market-based performance and accounting-based 
performance measures. Whereas more growth opportunities are associated with 
significant improvement in market-based performances of companies, it rather had 
negative impact on accounting-based performances. The result of the market-based 
performance was according to expectation but that of accounting-based performance 
was contrary to expectations. Regardless of the contrary finding, it was in line with 
empirical evidence indicating that, as growth opportunities increase, more stock 
options are granted but will not necessarily translate into improved financial 
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performances (Gaver &Gaver 1993, Kwon &Yin 2006, Smith Jr &Watts 1992). 
ROA was found to have a significant negative impact on Tobin’s Q which 
contradicts the findings made by Alghifari,Triharjono and Juhaeni (2013). The age of 
firms was found to impact positively on both the market-based and accounting-based 
performances of the companies but were both insignificant. This contradicts a 
number of research results such as Loderer and Waelchli (2009) and Deitiana and 
Habibuw (2015) who found that organisational performances worsen with age due to 
factors such as obsolescence, rigidity and rent-seeking behaviour. Nonetheless, our 
result concurs with the findings of Omondi and Muturi (2013) who found a positive 
impact of firm age on firm performances which is a demonstration that, old age 
comes with more experience, improved efficiency and overall organisational 
performance. 
   
From ROA point of view, the results of this study disagrees with those who have 
argued that offering broad-based compensation programmes will not lead to 
increased firm performances based on theories such as free rider problem 
(Oyer,2004), psychological expectancy theory (Vroom,1995), accounting myopia 
(Hall and Murphy, 2003) and worker-management alliance theory (Kim & Ouimet, 
2014; Pagano & Volpin,2005). On the basis of these findings, we accept hypothesis 
one that, there is positive relationship between broad-based equity compensation and 
ROA of U.S listed companies. Consequently, we conclude that, equity-based 
compensation leads to significant increase in ROA of companies and that agency 
problem seems to be solved if a firm adopts broad-based equity compensation to 
improve upon its accounting-based performance by using ROA as an indicator. 
Again, on the basis of ROA, scholars such as Morishima (1988), Holmström and 
Milgrom (1991) and Hochberg and Lindsey (2010),who espouse theories like  
reduction of information asymmetry, mutual monitoring and enhancement of 
efficiency wage theory and promotion of risk sharing between principal and agent 
due to implementation of broad-based equity compensation stand vindicated by this 
result.  On the contrary, if the company uses market-based performance measure to 
assess its performance, the result agrees with those who have held the view that 
offering broad-based compensation programmes will not lead to increased firm 
performances based on theories such as free rider problem (Oyer,2004), 
psychological expectancy theory (Vroom,1995), accounting myopia (Hall and 
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Murphy, 2003) and worker-management alliance theory (Kim & Ouimet, 2014; 
Pagano & Volpin,2005). The Tobin’s Q result also confirms the reasons for the 
rejection of stock option plans by shareholders in the U.S due to the extent to which 
it dwindles returns on companies’ market value (Randal & Kenneth,2000). Similarly, 
it lends credence to the statement that "companies are far less likely to think that 
their stock option program has a positive effect on their business results than any 
other kind of variable pay program" (Hewitt 1997:1). This is because, the agency 
problem will not be solved and will also serve as an indication of non-existence of 
efficient contracting. Consequently, we reject hypothesis two that there is positive 
relationship between broad-based equity compensation and Tobin’s Q of U.S listed 
companies. This also shows that, stakeholder maximisation theory by Freeman 
(1984) will equally not be met. As indicated by Hillegeist and Penalva (2003), this 
study has also confirmed that, apart from stock options compensation, other firm 
characteristics such as firm size, leverage, liquidity, growth opportunities and firm 
age can equally affect performances of firms as the above discussion proves the 
accuracy of most of the five predictions made.  
 
This research, like any other study was not without limitations. First and foremost is 
the choice of fair value of stock options as proxy for broad-based equity 
compensation. This decision was arrived at due to accuracy challenges of hand 
collecting the broad-based equity compensation data. Though stock options are very 
popular as far as equity compensation is concerned, it is not the only type available. 
The study also adopted ROA and Tobin’s Q as firm performance proxies, but 
obviously there are other equally important indicators of firm performances as 
already indicated in the theories under chapter five. Further, a variable such as the 
growth opportunities, has other equally potent substitutes. Also, other variables such 
as liquidity, leverage, ROA as accounting ratios have alternative ways of calculation 
depending on the company and industry. And considering the fact that, the data came 
from different industries, it cannot be one-size-fits-all as those ratios can be 
calculated in different ways. Again, the sample period is relatively short as such the 
result may change if a longer sample period is covered. Finally, this study did not 
include data from other equity-based compensations such as restricted stock, stock 
appreciation, warrants among others. In spited of the above limitations, this study has 
also contributed to the already existing debate on the effects to broad-based equity 
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compensation on firm performances, particularly, when ROA and Tobin’s Q are used 
as performance indicators. 
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